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The Iraqi government is the most murderous and aggressive
regime in the Middle East today. Ever since the Ba'ath Party took
power in 1968,' Iraq's respect for the norms of international law has
devolved to the point where it epitomizes the concept of the "rogue
state." The party ascended to power by military coup and formed a
police state that grows more oppressive every year, terrorizing its
population with murder and torture, and often murder by torture. Its
invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990, itself a totally
unacceptable violation of international law, is even less reprehensible
than its conduct in warfare, having used hostages as human shields,
pillaged and looted Kuwait, killed or deported to Iraq thousands of
Kuwaitis, and inflicted wanton destruction far in excess of the
confines of military necessity.2 Cold, evil and ruthless, Saddam
Hussein is the Ernst Stavro Blofeld3 of the modern world.
The greater travesty is that despite Iraq's complete disdain for
international law, the community of States, acting in accordance with
international law, has allowed the Ba'ath regime to remain in power.
J.D., New York University, 1994; LL.M., George Washington University,
2003 (expected).
1. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 57 (4th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter IRAQ COUNTRY STUDY].
2. Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the
Persian Gulf War: An Overview, 37 A.F.L. REv. 41 (1994).
3. Ernst Stavro Blofeld, the fictional nemesis of James Bond, attempted to
blackmail Great Britain and the United States with a nuclear weapon. IAN FLEMING,
THUNDERBALL (Viking Press, 1961). He also appeared in subsequent James Bond
novels and most of the early James Bond films.
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Iraq has therefore enjoyed the benefits of the principles of sovereign
equality, non-interference with internal affairs, and, for the most part,
non-use of force, without shouldering any of the responsibilities that
come with the privilege of recognition as a State. These
responsibilities include the non-use of force in its relations with other
States,4 'the duty not to support or promote terrorism, the duty to
comply with the law of war,6 the duty to observe and respect
fundamental human rights,7 and the duty to honor its agreements with
other States and international organizations (pacta sunt servanda).8
It is the latter obligation upon which this work will be focused,
particularly with respect to its agreements and obligations not to
develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (referred to
collectively as weapons of mass destruction'), and how they are to be
enforced when Iraq persists in ignoring its obligations in this area.
The phrase "800-pound gorilla" refers metaphorically to the
enormous gravity of the obligations, and to the State most likely to
end up enforcing them with military force, i.e. the United States,
whether unilaterally or by leading a coalition. This article will begin
with a presentation of a new approach to jus ad bellum which takes
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
5. Declaration On Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
And Co-operation Among States In Accordance With The Charter Of The United
Nations, Annex to G.A. Res. 2625, § 1, para. 10 (1970).
6. All States are bound to respect the laws of war as customary international
law. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, pmbl. para. 8, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 279 (".. .the inhabitants and
the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law
of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience"). See also JEAN PICTET,
DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1985).
7. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed as a "common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, pmbl. para. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (1948). Respect for fundamental human
rights is generally regarded today as a norm of customary international law. It should
be noted that the protection of fundamental human rights is among the obligations
that States taking countermeasures for wrongful internationals must continue to
honor. Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
art. 50, para. 1(b), Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
Fifty-third session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331,339.
9. Weapons of mass destruction also include radiological weapons; however, the
documented threat from Iraq has not to date included such weapons and they will not
be discussed further.
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just war theory to the next level, where force is used as a remedy to a
grave injury caused by the breach of an international obligation. The
next two sections will apply an injury-remedy approach to two prior
case studies involving Iraq's noncompliance with obligations not to
develop weapons of mass destruction, specifically the 1981 Israeli
strike on the Osiraq nuclear reactor, and the U.S.-UK strikes against
Iraq in December 1998 (Operation Desert Fox). Drawing upon much
of the background information presented in these two sections, this
article will conclude with a discussion of the burning question of 2002-
03: the lawfulness of the recently concluded Operation Iraqi
Freedom, in which the United States and a small coalition used force
without Security Council authorization to effect a regime change in
Iraq.
I. A Naturalist Approach
The prevailing philosophy behind the U.N. Charter framework
for dealing with use of force was that peace was more precious than
justice. The League of Nations, which had taken a legal approach to
prevent war by placing specific obligations upon members," had in
the end failed to check the aggression of the Axis powers that
ultimately triggered the Second World War. The drafters of the UN
Charter, on the other hand, took the political approach, recognizing
from the outset that its effectiveness in maintaining peace and
security would fundamentally depend on the collective willingness of
the Great Powers to "cooperate in defense of common interests.""
The primary purpose of the Charter, as well as that which
appears first in the text, is "[t]o maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace .... ,"2
During the San Francisco conference, the major powers defeated an
amendment to the above language that would have required that the
"collective measures" mentioned therein "be taken in accordance
with international law and justice."'3  The major powers were
10. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 10 (3d & rev.
ed., 1969)
11. Id. at 11.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
13. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 10, at 27-28.
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concerned that such a requirement would hamper the Security
Council's flexibility, for the objective of such "collective measures"
was to prevent or suppress the use of force, not to settle the
underlying dispute. 4  From this record it is quite evident that
decisions of such magnitude, to be made by the Security Council,
were in fact to be based on political considerations. International law
and justice had to settle for the more limited role expressed in the
Charter, that "adjustments or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" would take
place "in conformity with the principles of international law and
justice."'5 The political reality was that in preventing or halting a war
or other major crisis, the role of justice was distantly secondary,
inserted in the text of the Charter almost as an afterthought.
In post-Charter jus ad bellum, the most fundamental principle is
that of the renunciation of force in international relations. In the text
of the Charter this principle takes the form of article 2(4), which
reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.'6
It was intended that violations of this norm be resolved by the organs
established in the Charter, particularly the Security Council. The
Charter specifically delegates to the Security Council the function and
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. 7 In
responding to disputes, the Security Council may make
recommendations to member States,'8 or in more serious situations,
decide on measures to be taken by some or all States to maintain or
restore international peace and security,'" measures which member
States are required to carry out.' The Security Council wields the
14. Id.
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
16. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
17. Id. art. 24, para 1.
18. Id. art. 36, para. 1; id. art. 39.
19. Id. art. 39.
20. Id. art. 25.
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ultimate power-"it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 2" This is one of the Charter-based exceptions to article 2(4).
The other two Charter-based exceptions, the inherent right of
self-defense22 and enforcement action under regional arrangements,23
also look to the role of the Security Council in deciding on the
appropriate measures to be taken. Article 51 preserves the inherent
right of self-defense, but only "until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
Article 53(1) admonishes regional organizations that "[n]o
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."
In the Charter framework of jus ad bellum, all roads lead to the
Security Council chambers.
Certainly, Article 2(4) has not put a halt to the use of force by
States, but to question the validity of Article 2(4) solely on that basis
would be unfair. No one questions the validity, for example, of
statutes that outlaw murder, even though the daily news media is
replete with stories of shootings, abductions, and other heinous
crimes. On the other hand, the general population would assuredly
react negatively to the repeal of a statute that prohibits murder.
Similarly, the international community of states would equally
assuredly react negatively to the repeal of Article 2(4). Contrary to
what some would say, the prohibition of the use of force in inter-State
relations is indeed honored more in its compliance than its breach. In
stark contrast to world history up to the First World War, the fact that
one State is not at war with another State over some dispute is not a
newsworthy event. For the most part, the general prohibition of the
use of force has worked remarkably well.
The very large body of scholarly literature, however, is devoted
to the many exceptions, deviations, and occasional outright thumbing
of noses at this general prohibition. The one commonality to virtually
all of it is that one begins with the basic rule (no use of force in
international relations) and then proceeds to explain why an
exception is created or why Article 2(4) does not apply. Like all its
progenitorship, so this work must begin.
The basic principle of international law relating to the use of
21. Id. art. 42.
22. Id. art. 51.
23. Id. art. 53, para. 1.
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force is that States must refrain from using force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of other States. The objective of
war, which is to impose one State's will upon another,24 is rendered
invalid under this norm. In the UN Charter system, all States are
sovereign equals25 and in modern international law, no State has the
right to subjugate another State to its wishes or its control by using
methods whose end result is to kill people and break things.
However, like English grammar, Article 2(4) is so replete with
exceptions that the exceptions seem to swallow up the rule. Because
Article 2(4) has not deterred States from using force, a plethora of
legal theories have been developed-or revived-to circumvent the
basic rule. To name just a few, they include humanitarian
intervention, pro-democratic intervention, anticipatory self-defense,
defensive armed reprisal,26 and the new kid on the block, pre-emptive
self-defense-not one of which draws from the text of the UN
Charter. The reason for this can be partially attributed to the
paralysis of the Security Council during the Cold War.2 ' By 1970, the
Charter framework, and the Security Council itself, seemed so weak
and ineffective at dealing with real crises that renowned international
legal scholar Thomas Franck was driven to lament, "Who Killed
Article 2(4)?,,21
Professor Franck's lament was founded on a false premise;
Article 2(4) deserves not a funeral, but a bar-mitzvah. Thanks to the
resurrection of doctrines such as humanitarian intervention and
anticipatory self-defense, Article 2(4) has grown out of the overly
simplistic, almost childlike vision of a Utopian system where, as
Professor Franck put it, "the national interest is perceived to be
congruent with a renunciation of the use of military force in inter-
state relations., 29 To borrow a witticism from Professor Henkin, the
reports of the death of Article 2(4) are indeed greatly exaggerated."
24. CARL VON CLAUSWITZ, ON WAR 83 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. &
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (1832).
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
26. A creation of Yoram Dinstein in YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 194 (3d ed. 2001).
27. The USSR and U.S., who were the primary adversaries during the Cold War,
both had veto powers in the Security Council and, being a political body, many
actions that could have taken place were blocked due to political considerations.
28. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing
the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
29. Id. at 837.
30. Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly
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Far from being dead, it has in fact matured.
Why has the growth of jus ad bellum taken place? Why have
States and scholars alike had to resort to thinking outside the Charter
framework to find legal underpinnings for use of force that was
clearly not in self-defense or authorized by the Security Council, but
which achieved just results nonetheless? Why are the likes of Manuel
Noriega and Saddam Hussein able to claim the protection of
international law, when the former has certainly not been missed and
the latter would be even less so? Why does the General Assembly
condemn Israel for attacking terrorist targets, and barely flinches
when other States call for its annihilation?
While the answers to such complex questions are equally
complex, they can all be traced to two fundamental flaws in the
Charter paradigm for jus ad bellum. The first is that the U.N. organs
designed to address, diffuse, and resolve crises that threaten
international peace and security are political organs, and its members
are driven by their own national self-interests and political
considerations rather than by the principles of international law. The
other, deeper flaw is that the U.N. Charter was based on the premise
that peace is preferable to justice. The fact that so many
subdisciplines of jus ad bellum have evolved in the last few decades is
an indicator that the subordination of justice to peace offends the
notions of many as to how the world should be.
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter set forth rules on inter-State
relations that are very clear and unambiguous on their face. Article
2(4) prohibits States from using force against other States, and Article
51 permits a State to use force, in accordance with its inherent right of
self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against that State." However,
if States had followed the exact letter of the Charter, the world would
be a vastly different place. In the absence of the exercise of
anticipatory self-defense, Israel would have been obliterated from the
map in 1967. But for the renewed recognition of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, Kosovo would be homogeneously Serb
today and Cambodia might either still be a "killing field" or simply
Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971). Professor Henkin wrote, "What has
become obsolete is the notion that nations are as free to indulge in [war] as ever, and
the death of that notion is accepted in the Charter." Id. at 545.
31. U.N. CHARTER article 51 reads in part, "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
20031
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have ceased to exist for lack of a population. It is precisely because
Article 2(4) is too rigid that States are prone to "violate[] it, ignore[]
it, run roughshod over it, and explain[] it away,"32 at least when the
Security Council fails to discharge its function in any given situation.
It is a sense of justice that pulls States away from complying with the
letter of Articles 2(4) and 51 and drives them to resort to "self-help."
A lack of pull towards compliance is cause to challenge the legitimacy
of such a rule. As Professor Franck put it:
A rule without exculpation, while seeming to court
legitimacy by its apparent simplistic clarity, may
actually appear illegitimate by producing results that
appear so extraordinarily unjust, cavalier, unfair, even
absurd, as to undermine the rule's ability to exert a
strong pull to compliance.33
While other factors besides fairness contribute to the legitimacy
of a rule and ultimately to its pull towards compliance," one cannot
deny that in international law, the more a rule is regarded as unfair,
i.e. favoring an unjust result, the less reliable it shall be in predicting
the outcome of inter-State relations. The growth of jus ad bellum out
of the cocoon of the UN Charter, by the resurrection of some legal
theories and the creation of others, is an expression of the naturalist
rejection of the unfair absolutism of the text of the Charter. State
practice has proven again and again that justice is preferable to peace.
For Article 2(4)-and the general norms of sovereign equality
and renunciation of force-to remain good law, any deviation from it
must have just cause. For a State to have just cause in violating the
norm, it must have suffered some injury at the hands of another State.
If the injury is caused by the other State's breach of its international
obligations, the State committing the breach will be responsible for
the injury.3"
32. Franck, supra note 28, at 810.
33. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 73
(1990).
34. The other factors include the purported authority making the rule, whether
the rule has been enacted in accordance with the procedures of that rule-making
authority, and the extent to which the rule adheres to the rest of international law.
Thomas M. Franck, The Legitimacy of Law and Institutions, 240 RECUEIL DES COURS
41, 42 (1993-Il).
35. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, arts. 1, 31.
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Some obligations of States to other States are so vital to the
maintenance of peace and security that their breach inflicts injury to
other States that is so great that the appropriate remedy can only be
achieved by the threat or use of force. From this theory all other
doctrines concerning the use of force can be derived. A tort-based
just war theory-duty, breach, -injury, remedy-can serve as a
framework for evaluating such diverse doctrines as self-defense,
anticipatory self-defense, preemptive self-defense, protection of
nationals, humanitarian intervention, intervention to preserve forms
of government, national liberation, peace enforcement, and
enforcement of other obligations. The principle may be restated
thusly:
When a State breaches an obligation, and that breach
results in an injury, the injured party has the right to a
remedy from the State that breached the obligation.
This article will apply this theory to the enforcement of arms
control and disarmament agreements by military force, using the case
studies of the 1981 Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osiraq
and the 1998 air strikes on Iraq in response to its non-compliance with
Security Council Resolution 687 (Operation Desert Fox).
II. The Nuclear Spectre: The Destruction of Osiraq by Israel
A. What Happened
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force struck the Osiraq nuclear
reactor near Baghdad and destroyed it.36 Although Iraq claimed to be
conducting nuclear research and developing "peaceful uses of atomic
energy,"37 Israel asserted that Iraq was embarked on a program to
develop nuclear weapons for use against Israel,38 that Osiraq was
actually designed to produce the weapons,39 and that the reactor was
36. Letter dated 8 June 1981 from the representative of Israel to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., Supp. Apr.-Jun. 1981, at 55, U.N. Doc.
S/14510 (1981).
37. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 26, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (1981).
38. Id. at 41-46; U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2284th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2284
(1981).
39. U.N. Doc. S/14510, supra note 36.
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to become operational as early as July 1981. 4
In the debates in the Security Council that ensued,41 Israel
justified its strike on the grounds of anticipatory self-defense. Israel
cited numerous instances of Iraq's conspiracy to destroy Israel. Iraqi
forces, argued Israel, had taken part in three Arab wars against it: the
Israeli War of Independence in 1948, the Six-Day War in 1967, and
the Yom Kippur War in 1973 . Israel also referred to statements of
Iraqi officials: from Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr,
"Efforts... must be consolidated to support the liquidation of the
racist Zionist entity . .. ,,;4' and from the Iraqi ambassador to India,
"Iraq does not accept the existence of a Zionist state in Palestine...
the only solution is war.
' 4
Israel also asserted various facts as evidence that Iraq was
embarked on a program to develop nuclear weapons. Iraq, alleged
Israel, had in 1974 attempted to buy a gas-graphite reactor,4 5 the same
type of reactor used by the nuclear powers to extract plutonium for
use in nuclear bombs. 6 Iraq had purchased the necessary facilities for
reprocessing nuclear fuel,47 which would have simplified the recovery
of plutonium.4" Furthermore, averred Israel, Iraq had been
stockpiling uranium. 4' Finally, Iraq had insisted on the availability of
weapons-grade fuel for the Osiraq reactor," even though France (who
sold the reactor to Iraq) had offered to substitute a type of fuel
("caramel") suitable for operating the reactor but which was not
sufficiently enriched for use in a nuclear bomb."
Despite Israel's arguments, not one of which was refuted by any
other State, including Iraq, 2 the Security Council was not convinced
40. Id.
41. The matter was debated on June 12-19, 1981. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th-
2288th mtgs., U.N. Docs. S/PV.2280-2288 (1981).
42. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280, supra note 37, at 41.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 46.
46. TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 47 (1996).
47. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280, supra note 37, at 47.
48. MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 43.
49. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280, supra note 37, at 47.
50. Id.
51. MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 50-51.
52. In the debates, Iraq made no attempt to refute any of the facts asserted
above. Iraq's position was centered on two points: (1) Israel's failure to subscribe to
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that Israel's strike on Osiraq was justified. On June 19, less than two
weeks after the strike, the Security Council passed Resolution 487, in
which it "[sitrongly condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of
international conduct."53  Even Israel's staunchest ally, the United
States, voted in favor of the resolution, though not for the reasons
that most other members did. 4
The Security Council's response to Osiraq is an example of U.N.
politics forcing a "race to the bottom." The Council did not seriously
debate the facts asserted by Israel, and blindly accepted the fallacy
that Iraq's adherence to the IAEA safeguards regime somehow
"vindicated" it.5 Furthermore, in the face of Israeli arguments, based
on the writings of eminent publicists of international law suggesting
that anticipatory self-defense against a nuclear strike was a necessary
right, 6 only a small number of States even discussed the right to
anticipatory self-defense. Even then, these States did little more than
apply the traditional elements of the doctrine, the applicability of
which is questionable. Syria's response was nothing more than a
diatribe against "Israeli atrocities, Israeli arrogance, Israeli
expansionism,... [and the] Israeli cancer in our region."57
Much has already been written about Osiraq and the
applicability of anticipatory self-defense to that situation and to
nuclear weapons in general, and it is not the purpose of this paper to
rehash old arguments. In this work, the justification of the strike on
Osiraq will be examined against the theory presented in the previous
section (duty, breach, injury, remedy). However, it is relevant and
useful to conduct a brief exposition of the law of anticipatory self-
IAEA safeguards with respect to its nuclear program, as Iraq had done; and (2) Iraq
had adhered to all IAEA safeguards put in place on its nuclear program, and
therefore Iraq could not be developing nuclear weapons. Amazingly, many members
of the Council accepted that argument. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th-2288th mtgs.,
supra note 41.
53. S.C. Res. 487, 1 (1981).
54. The United States voted in favor of S.C. Resolution 487 because it believed
that Israel had failed to exhaust peaceful means for resolving the matter. The U.S.
did not comment on Israel's argument of anticipatory self-defense. U.N. SCOR, 36th
Sess., 2288th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 (1981).
55. MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 59. Even the IAEA, however, was concerned
that Iraq was trying to develop nuclear weapons despite its adherence to the
safeguards. Id.
56. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280, supra note 37, at 53-55; U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288, supra
note 54, at 33 (citing Humphrey Waldock, Stephen Schwebel and Myres McDougal).
57. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2284, supra note 38, at 5.
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defense and how scholars have applied it to Osiraq.
B. Application of Anticipatory Self-Defense to Osiraq
Most eminent jurists agree on the right of anticipatory self-
defense in pre-Charter, customary international law.58 The legal
criterion for justifyihg the use of force as an act of anticipatory self-
defense usually follows classical Caroline doctrine of the right of self-
preservation," that the State invoking it must "show a necessity for
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation." 6
The UN Charter does not expressly confirm the right of
anticipatory self-defense. Article 51 reads, "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations..." (emphasis added). The Charter does not speak to
whether a State retains the right to strike first in a situation where an
armed attack is known to be imminent. Scholars disagree whether
Article 51 has superseded the right to anticipatory self-defense.
Those who argue against such a right in post-Charter international
law (the "restrictionist" view) look to the plain meaning of Article 51,
which permits self-defense "if an armed attack occurs,"61 i.e., after the
attacking State has committed its forces to the armed attack. Those
who believe the "counter-restrictionist" view, that Article 51 does not
limit the right to anticipatory defense, argue realism-that the
Charter cannot be construed to require a State to allow its destruction
before resorting to measures to defend itself.62 If one supposes, as this
58. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1 OPPENHEIM]; D.W. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-59 (1958); C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of
Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECEUIL DES COURS 451, 464
(1952-11); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
257 (1963); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 234 (1961); DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 173.
59. BROWNLIE, supra note 58, at 257.
60. BOWErr, supra note 58, at 59. For the original text of the formulation, see
Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6,
1842), in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 669 (1983).
61. LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 141 (2d
ed. 1979); BROWNLIE, supra note 58, at 275; 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
156 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
62. Waldock, supra note 58, at 498; BOWETr, supra note 58, at 191; Military And
Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (merits), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 347 (June 27) (Schwebel, J. dissenting). Dinstein takes the restrictionist
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author does, that the counter-restrictionist view of anticipatory self-
defense is the better reflection of international law as practiced by
States, then Israel's justification of its attack on Osiraq63 must now be
evaluated on that basis.
The latest edition of Oppenheim's International Law translates
the Caroline formula into the following elements: first, an armed
attack is launched, or is imminent, against a State's territory,
nationals, and/or forces.6' Second, an urgent necessity to defend
against that attack must exist." Third, there must be no practical
alternative to taking measures in self-defense 66 Fourth, the measures
taken in self-defense are limited to those necessary to stop or prevent
the attack.67
The crucial matter in the Osiraq affair would appear to be
whether an attack on Israel was imminent. Israel claimed that the
reactor would have gone on-line as early as the following month, and
that striking the reactor after it had become "hot" would have
inflicted far greater casualties.68 Israel also claimed that the nuclear
bombs that an operational Osiraq reactor would be capable of
producing would be used against. Israel.69 Assuming that the factual
evidence presented by Israel made it clear that Iraq was embarked on
a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons (this evidence will
be discussed later), the dispositive issue was the intentions of Iraq
towards Israel at the time of the strike.7" In his comprehensive study
view of Article 51, but would allow action in "interceptive self-defense," when an
attack is imminent and practically unavoidable, e.g. Israel's first strike in the 1967
Six-Day War. DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 168-173. Oscar Schachter advances the
drafting history of Article 51 as manifesting the intent to not impair the pre-Charter
right of self-defense. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1633-1634 (1984).
63. Specifically, Israel cited the reason for its attack thusly: "Under no
circumstances will we allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction
against our people. We shall defend the citizens of Israel in time, and with all the
means at our disposal." U.N. Doc. S/14510, supra note 36.
64. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 58, at 422.
65. Id.
66. Id. If another state has jurisdiction to stop or prevent the attack but is unable
or unwilling to do so, this element is satisfied. Id.
67. Id. The traditional requirement of proportionality indirectly figures into this
element. Oppenheim also adds a fifth element: that, in the case of collective defense,
the victim state must request assistance. Id. Since the Osiraq was not a matter of
collective defense, that element will not be discussed further.
68. U.N. Doc. S/14510, supra note 36.
69. Id.
70. See MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 45.
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of the case, Timothy McCormack takes into account Israel's quite
reasonable position that Iraq's prior wars with Israel and the lack of
any peace settlement made Iraq a continuing threat to Israel.'
McCormack also points out that Iraq had ambitions of regional
hegemony, a goal which would be furthered by a nuclear attack,72 and
furthermore that Saddam Hussein had no moral reservations about
using nuclear weapons to destroy the "Zionist entity" and its
population.73 However, the latter argument is only proven with
knowledge after the fact;" Israel could not have proven this from the
events contemporaneous with the strike.
Even if Iraq's regional aspirations and designs towards Israel
were proven, the question of imminency still remains. McCormack
concludes that once Osiraq became operational, it would have taken
12 to 18 months for it to produce enough plutonium for a single
nuclear device.75 Because Iraq would also have to make the explosive
device, McCormack estimates that "it may well have taken longer
than two years for Iraq to produce a nuclear weapon."76 Although
Matt Nydell has shown a genuine tactical need for Israel to destroy
Iraq's nuclear weapons before they be installed in delivery devices
and dispersed,77 it appears that Iraq's nuclear program had a long way
to go before that would even be a consideration. Ultimately, it
cannot be shown that an armed attack on Israel was imminent."
71. Id. at 102.
72. Id. at 103.
73. Id.
74. The one-time head of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, now a defector to the
West, confirms that Saddam Hussein's original plan was to develop a crude device,
too large for a warhead, and "drop one unannounced on Israel." KHIDHIR HAMZA,
SADDAM'S BOMBMAKER 333 (2000).
75. MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 104.
76. Id. at 105.
77. Matt S. Nydell, Note, Tensions Between International Law and Strategic
Security: Implications of Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J.
INT'L L. 459, 484, n.124 (1984). In addition, Thomas Mallison and Sally Mallison
advance the fact that the strike had been planned since 1979 as further proof that the
threat was not imminent. W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli
Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor. Aggression or Self-
Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 430 (1982). This author respectfully
disagrees with that assertion; the fact that the strike was a long time in the making
would actually show that Israel acted with restraint, waiting to strike until what Israel
regarded as the last possible moment.
78. See Georges Fischer, Le Bombardement par Israel d'un Rgacteur Nuclaire
Irakien, 27 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 147, 163 (1981); John
Quigley, Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Nuclear Reactor: A Reply, 9 TEMP. INT'L &
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The case of Osiraq exposes the long-recognized difficulty in
applying the Caroline doctrine, formulated in the context of
defending against armed bands operating from another State, 9 to
anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear age. As Waldock put it,
if the action of the United Nations is obstructed,
delayed or inadequate and the armed attack becomes
manifestly imminent, then it would be a travesty of the
purpose of the Charter to compel a defending State to
allow its assailant to deliver the first perhaps fatal
blow.... To cut down the customary right of self-
defence beyond even the Caroline doctrine does not
make sense in times when the speed and power of
weapons of attack has [sic] enormously increased.'0
McDougal and Feliciano cite the above passage to argue against the
restrictionist view of Article 51.1 Even Professor Henkin, who comes
out unequivocally in favor of the restrictionist view, acknowledges the
argument that upon clear evidence of a sudden, all-out nuclear attack
that is so imminent as to be unpreventable, "the only meaningful
defense for the potential victim might indeed be the preemptive
attack."8'2 However, opponents of this position argue that the threat
of nuclear war further compels the need to maintain a clear
distinction between anticipatory self-defense (i.e. the Caroline
formula) and preemptive strikes, which do not fit within that
formula. 3 Balanced analyses of the two arguments seem to yield no
clear answer.84
Nagendra Singh analyzed the so-called "right" to anticipatory
self-defense as specifically applied to defense against a nuclear
COMP. L.J. 441 (1995); Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq
Reactor: A Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 259, 261 (1996) (though
D'Amato would justify the strike on other grounds); DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 169
(though Dinstein would have justified the strike based on Israel's continuing war with
Iraq).
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 58, at 257.
80. Waldock, supra note 58, at 498.
81. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 58, at 238.
82. HENKIN, supra note 61, at 144.
83. Schachter, supra note 62, at 1634 (citing HENKIN, supra note 61).
84. See id.
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strike.85 Having presented the conflict between the confines of
Article 51 and the need for self-preservation in the nuclear age, Judge
Singh's proposed solution was to deem an armed attack as having
begun at the time the attack is launched, rather than when the
delivery system violates the territory of the target State.8 6 However,
his solution could not have taken into account the realities of modern
nuclear military tactics. Because nuclear weapons have the potential
of defeating (or destroying) the enemy on the first strike, an aggressor
State seems far more likely to use nuclear weapons in a surprise
attack than by a means that the defending State could easily detect
and repel. Nuclear-armed aircraft and submarines can be intercepted
and destroyed en route at minimal risk to the territory of the
defending State. However, the response time to a nuclear attack
launched by missiles from the territory of the attacking State is
measured in minutes. A reasonable belief that such an attack will
occur puts the defending State on its highest guard indefinitely-
exactly the kind of intolerable situation that justified Israel's first
strike in the Six-Day War. Furthermore, the capability of States to
intercept and destroy missiles en route is still very much in its infancy.
Judge Singh's formula was written prior to the contemporary
problems of rogue states and large-scale terrorist attacks, and it does
not consider the possibility that the nuclear weapon would be
delivered clandestinely.
Scholarly studies of the attack on Osiraq differ widely as to
whether the attack was justifiable as anticipatory self-defense. Some
have rejected the justification on the grounds that an Iraqi attack on
Israel was not imminent. Those who have supported it have argued
that the Caroline formula for self-defense, as applied to nuclear
weapons, is too restrictive for today's reality.' Beth Polebaum
85. M. Nagendra Singh, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 5 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. 3 (1956).
86. Id. at 25. He makes the assumption that the decision to launch the attack is
irrevocable, which may be a reasonable assumption in the case of missiles, but not
necessarily in the case of submarines or aircraft. Id. at 25-26.
87. Nydell, supra note 77, at 483; Mallison & Mallison, supra note 77, at 431;
Joanne E. Birnberg, The Sun Sets On Tamuz 1: The Israeli Raid on Iraq's Nuclear
Reactor, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 85, 105 (1983). Birnberg admits, however, that one
element of self-defense, that the State invoking it be the target of hostile activities
from the State against which it will be invoked, was satisfied by Iraq's manifestation
of its desire and intent to destroy Israel. Professor Quigley appears to reject the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense altogether. Quigley, supra note 78.
88. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging
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employed a "reasonable nation" test to argue that Israel's
determination that the threat from Iraq was sufficiently great to
justify a preemptive strike was completely reasonable." The conflicts
between the Caroline formula, modern weapons technology, and
between the restrictionist and counter-restrictionist interpretations of
Article 51, result in the failure of the doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense to provide a satisfactory framework for analyzing the legality
of preemptive strikes against nuclear installations such as that against
Osiraq in 1981.
C. Osiraq as a Remedy to an Injury
A different analytical framework, therefore, must be applied. If
Iraq breached a duty and thereby caused injury to Israel that was so
severe that the attack on Osiraq was an appropriate remedy, then the
attack was just.
1. Iraq's duty
Iraq is one of many signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT).' ° It deposited its instrument of ratification to the NPT
on October 29, 1969, and the NPT entered into force for Iraq on
March 5, 1970, which is the date of entry into force of the Treaty
itself.9 The primary purpose of the Treaty is "to avert the danger of
[nuclear] war, 92 and its regime is based on the "[b]elie[f] that the
Standard For A Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 223 (1984); Louis Rene Beres,
Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor 9 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 437 (1995); Uri Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid upon the Iraqi Nuclear
Reactor and the Right of Self-Defense, 109 MIL. L. REV. 191, 220-221. Bruce Hurwitz
also rejects the right of anticipatory self-defense, but curiously finds the strike
justified anyway. Bruce Hurwitz, To the Editors-in-Chief, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 198
(1984). Professor D'Amato suggests that the strike was permissible because the force
was not used against the territorial integrity or political independence of Iraq.
Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 584, 585 (1983).
89. Polebaum, supra note 88, at 208. Louis Capezzuto does not address the
question directly, but endorses Polebaum's "reasonableness" approach. Louis J.
Capezzuto, Preemptive Strikes Against Nuclear Terrorists and Their Sponsors: A
Reasonable Solution, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 375, 393 (1993).
90. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
91. E-mail from Francis J. Holleran, Depositary Officer, Office of the Assistant
Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the author (Sept. 25,
2002, 3:38 p.m. EST) (on file with author).
92. NPT, supra note 90, pmbl. para. 2.
2003]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger
of nuclear war."'93 Article II of the NPT reads,
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 94
As consideration for abandoning their nuclear aspirations, the
non-nuclear States gain access to peaceful nuclear technology,
including special fissionable material, but only if the material is
subject to safeguards." The purpose of those safeguards, which are
implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is
"verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under [the
NPT] with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices."96 Although the Treaty includes provisions for withdrawal, 97
Iraq has not done so and its obligation not to develop nuclear
weapons continues under the NPT
2. Iraq breached its duty
The facts available on June 7, 1981 showed that Iraq had violated
its duty not to develop nuclear weapons; indeed, Iraq was engaged in
a large-scale subterfuge by using nuclear technology and material,
93. Id. pmbl. para. 3. In interpreting the context of the purpose of a treaty, the
treaty's preamble must be taken into consideration. Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 31, para. 2.
94. NPT, supra note 90, art. II (emphasis added). The NPT, at Article IX,
paragraph 3, defines "nuclear-weapon State" as one which has manufactured and
detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967. As of that date, the five nuclear
weapon States were the United States, Great Britain, France, the USSR, and China.
All other States are considered "non-nuclear-weapon States" under the NPT.
95. Id. art. III, para. 2.
96. Id. art. III, para. 1.
97. Id. art. X, para. 1.
98. Iraq has similar obligations under Security Council resolutions, which will be
dealt with in the section on Operation Desert Fox.
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which it could not have obtained outside of the NPT-safeguards
regime, to do the very thing the regime was designed to prevent.
The detailed facts of the case, as they were available in 1981, are
sufficiently well documented to establish conclusively that Iraq
intended to use the Osiraq reactor to develop fissionable nuclear
material suitable for making a nuclear explosive device. Iraq's first
nuclear reactor was a two thermal megawatt reactor built by the
Soviets,99 suitable for research and little else. In the 1970s, Iraq
sought a larger, more powerful reactor.'" Having decided to buy one
from France, Iraq's first choice was a 1500 thermal megawatt gas-
graphite reactor.t"' As Timothy McCormack's analysis makes clear,
Iraq could only have arrived at that choice of reactors if its real intent
was neither research nor production of electricity, but in fact to build
a nuclear weapon. The gas-graphite reactor, while suitable for
generating electricity, had been superseded by more efficient reactor
technology,"°2 and the need for such capability was questionable given
Iraq's vast oil reserves."3 Iraq's real interest in the gas-graphite
reactor was that it produced large quantities of plutonium, which
could be used as the fissionable material for a nuclear bomb.l°
Iraq's second choice, the Osiris model, was also questionable.
The Osiris model was not suitable for producing large amounts of
electricity, but was eminently suitable for research.05 However, the
Iraqi nuclear program was small and immature, with no apparent
need for a 75 thermal megawatt Osiris reactor when a one to five
thermal megawatt model would have sufficed."° The real reason for
the Osiris as Iraq's second choice was, like the gas-graphite model,
the ability to produce "significant quantities" of plutonium.1 7
In addition, Iraq's preference of highly enriched nuclear fuel was
also suspect. The original agreement for the sale of the reactor had
also provided for the sale of nearly 80 kilograms of 93% enriched
99. MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 46.
100. Id. at 46-47.
101. Id. at 47.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 48.
104. Id. at 47. France, Great Britain, the U.S. and the USSR were all producing
weapons-grade plutonium using this technology. Id.
105. Id. at 47-48.
106. Id. at 48.
107. Id. at 49.
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uranium, enough to build up to five nuclear bombs."" In response to
pressure from Israel, the U.S. and other States, France offered to
substitute a different fuel.0 9 This 7% enriched fuel, called "caramel,"
was suitable for operating the Osiris reactor but could not be used to
build an explosive device."'  Iraq, however, insisted on the 93%
enriched fuel."'
At the time of the Israeli strike on Osiraq, Iraq had bought over
250 tons of natural uranium from other countries. ' 2 Iraq had no
reactor that could be fueled with natural uranium.113 The only
reasonable explanation for Iraq's stockpiling of natural uranium was
to blanket the core of the Osiraq core-a procedure necessary for the
production of plutonium."' Even more damning was Iraq's effort to
stockpile depleted uranium." 5 Large quantities of depleted uranium
have only two uses: (1) in "breeder" reactors, of which Iraq had
none;"' and (2) making the recovery of plutonium safer."7
The above facts, all known at the time of the strike, show that
Iraq was attempting to manufacture a nuclear weapon,"8 even though
it had a clear obligation under the NPT not to do so. The element of
breach is established.
3. What was the injury?
Although Iraq's breach of its duty not to develop nuclear
weapons is established, the extent of the injury to Israel is not as well
108. Id. at 50.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 50-51.
111. Id. at 51. It is suggested that Iraq may have had legitimate, research-based
reasons for wanting the high enriched fuel. Id. Given the totality of the
circumstances, however, this author considers the most likely motive for this to be the
furtherance of its clandestine nuclear program.
112. Id. at 52-53.
113. Id. at 53.
114. Id. at 52.
115. Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 54. A "breeder" reactor is used to produce fuel for other reactors. The
only working models are in France. Id.
117. Id. at 53.
118. Subsequent revelations make it even more clear that that was Iraq's intent. A
book by the head of Iraq's nuclear program, who eventually defected to the West,
recounts a meeting in which Saddam Hussein himself asks "When will you deliver the
plutonium for the bomb?" HAMZA, supra note 74, at 116. When the head of the
extraction team reminded him of Iraq's proscriptions in the NPT, Saddam's response
was to put him in jail. Id. at 116-117.
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defined. When a State commits an armed attack on another State, in
breach of its duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in its
international relations,"9 the injury sustained by the State against
which the armed attack is directed is readily discernable. This is not
so when the attack has not yet occurred. In order for Israel's attack
on Osiraq to be justifiable, it must be shown that Iraq's breach of its
duty injured other States, and specifically Israel, in such way that the
use of force against Osiraq was an appropriate remedy.
The relationship of nuclear weapons to anticipatory self-defense
has been pondered almost since the inception of the UN Charter. As
early as 1946, the Atomic Energy Commission, in considering
whether anticipatory self-defense was part of the inherent right to
self-defense, reported to the Security Council:
In consideration of the problem of violation of the
terms of the treaty or convention [a hypothetical
convention controlling nuclear weapons], it should
also be borne in mind that a violation might be of so
grave a character as to give rise to the inherent right of
self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
20
Judge Waldock viewed the report as an affirmation that just as
preparation for conventional war may constitute an "armed attack"
under Article 51, "preparations for atomic warfare in breach of the
Convention would in view of the appalling power of the weapon, have
to be treated as an 'armed attack' within Article 51. "121
Writers disagree on the exact moment at which an anticipatory
strike against a nuclear threat may be lawfully carried out. Judge
Singh placed that moment at the time the attack is launched,'22
requiring that the attacking State commit the "last irrevocable act"
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
120. U.N. Doc. AEC/18/Rev. 1, at 24; AEC, Special Supp., 1946, at 109-110,
reprinted in GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 10, at 347.
121. Waldock, supra note 58, at 498. Judge Waldock reads the phrase in Article 51
"if an armed attack occurs" to not necessarily mean after it occurs, noting that the
French text reads "dans un cas ofi un Membre des Nations Unies est l'objet d'une
agression arm6e" (in a case where a Member of the United Nations is the object of
an armed attack). Id. at 497 (translation from French by the author).
122. Singh, supra note 85, at 25.
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necessary for the attack to take place.' However, Singh was
envisioning nuclear attacks by submarine or aircraft, i.e. means of
delivery that could be easily detected and intercepted. To apply such
criteria to delivery systems that cannot be easily detected or
intercepted, such as the launching of ICBMs or clandestine delivery
in a cargo container, would run contrary to the basic premise, as
expressed by Singh himself, that "in nuclear warfare time is of the
very essence."'24  The supposition that the point at which an
anticipatory strike should be justified comes earlier than the "last
irrevocable act" has support from those who have critiqued Singh's
argument. 25 Indeed, the official U.S. formulation of this principle,
which the author coins the "Kennedy formula," is that "[n]uclear
weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any
substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in
their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to
peace."'26
The idea that a State may be "injured" by an attack that has yet
to come but is clearly imminent, and therefore may use force in
response, has been validated by State practice in situations where the
imminency of the attack was clear. The purest example of post-
Charter anticipatory self-defense is the 1967 Six-Day War between
Israel and its neighbors. Although Israel was the first to actually
strike, a number of factors taken together lead to the reasonable
conclusion that an armed attack on Israel was imminent.2 7 Those
facts included the peremptory expulsion of the U.N. peacekeeping
force (UNEF I) from the Sinai,'26 the unprecedented massing of
Egyptian forces along the border,' 29 the closure of the Straits of Tiran
(effectively blockading Israel's only southern access to the high
seas),'3 ° the inflammatory rhetoric of the Egyptian president,'3' and
123. Id. at 26.
124. Id. at 24-25.
125. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 58, at 240.
126. Address by U.S. President John F. Kennedy, The Soviet Threat to the
Americas, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715, 716 (1962). The address was made during the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
127. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 83 (2d ed. 1977).
128. Id. See also UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 76 (2d ed. 1990).
129. WALZER, supra note 127, at 82.
130. Id. at 83. With the support of the international community, Israel took the
position that the closure of Straits, an international waterway, would constitute an act
of war (casus belli) on Israel. Id.
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the sudden alliances of Jordanian and Iraqi forces under Egyptian
control. 3 2 Israel's first strike was justified even though no attack on
Israel had yet taken place.
The international community of States for the most part accepted
Israel's justification. Draft resolutions condemning Israel were
defeated in both the Security Council and General Assembly. 3 3 The
contention that the Israeli first strike was an act of lawful anticipatory
self-defense is not widely challenged."'
In that case, the injury to Israel was in subjecting it to the
intolerable situation of an indefinitely high alert, putting Israel at a
significant tactical disadvantage if it did not strike on its own terms.
As Michael Walzer put it, "[i]t would have opened Israel to attack at
any time. It would have represented a drastic erosion of Israeli
security such as only a determined enemy would hope to bring
about."135
It cannot be said that Iraq's development of nuclear weapons, in
breach of its NPT obligations, was a casus belli with respect to all
States. Had the attack on Osiraq been committed by Brazil, a
justification of anticipatory self-defense would clearly have been
invalid, for Iraq had not threatened or used force against Brazil. Nor
can it be said that the development of nuclear weapons per se, in the
absence of any obligation not to do so, inflicts any injury upon other
States. In the absence of a threat or use of force, the appropriate and
proportional remedy for development of nuclear weapons in violation
of the NPT is for other States to suspend their obligations to Iraq
under the NPT,'36 e.g. by suspending any programs to supply
equipment, technology, or materials to Iraq. Although subsequent
acts by Iraq demonstrate its propensities toward aggression against
other States and utter disregard of its international obligations,'37
131. A week before the war began, President Nasser announced that if war broke
out, Egypt's objective would be nothing less than the destruction of Israel. Id.
132. Id.
133. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 135th mtg. at 5 (1967); U.N. GAOR, 5th Emer. Spec.
Sess., 154th mtg. at 15-17.
134. See, e.g., Richard Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW
AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 51 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David
J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
135. WALZER, supra note 127, at 84.
136. Draft Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 49, para. 2.
137. E.g., Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and against Iranian
forces during the Iran-Iraq War, the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, the
attacks on Iraqi dissident populations after the Gulf War, and the continued refusal
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these acts cannot be used in hindsight to find an injury to the
international community as a whole, because they had not happened
yet.
The injury to Israel, however, is an entirely different matter.
Beth Polebaum has proposed a two-tiered analysis to determine
whether a State's perception of an imminent nuclear attack is
reasonable: (1) what danger does the State perceive; and (2) whether
a reasonable State would preemptively strike in such a situation.'38
The specific questions to be addressed in this context are: (1) what
was Israel's perception that a nuclear attack from Iraq was imminent;
and (2) was Israel's perception reasonable, and would a reasonable
nation have acted in the same manner as Israel did.
Israel perceived an enormous threat from Iraq. Iraqi forces had
participated in wars against Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973.139 Of
all the Arab states in the region, Iraq had consistently taken the
hardest line against any relationship with Israel or even recognition of
Israel as a State.'0 Iraq had declared that it does not consider itself "a
party to any resolution, procedure or measure in armistice or cease-
fire agreement or negotiations or peace with Israel, now or in the
future."'4' Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had declared that the
basis of the Ba'ath party in Iraq is "the liberation of Palestine."'' 2
Iraq had been a major supporter of Palestinian terrorist groups.'43 In
January 1980, Iraq's Foreign Minister Hamadi said, ".... the land of
Palestine is an Arab land and we cannot conceive giving it up....
The struggle against Zionism is for us a struggle in which there can be
no compromise."'" Finally, in August 1980, Saddam Hussein said,
"[A] better decision [than boycotting any nation with an embassy in
Jerusalem] would be to destroy Tel Aviv with bombs. But we have to
use the weapons available until it is actually possible to respond to the
enemy with bombs.' ' 45 Israel's perception of a threat of attack from
of Iraq to disarm its weapons of mass destruction as ordered by the Security Council
under Chapter VII.
138. Polebaum, supra note 88, at 209.
139. Shoham, supra note 88, at 206 n.67.
140. Id. nn.66 & 68-69.
141. Id. n.69.
142. AI-Hawadith (Apr. 17, 1981), cited in Shoham, supra note 88, at 206. The
phrase "liberation of Palestine" is an oft-used euphemism for "annihilation of Israel."
143. Shoham, supra note 88, at 206.
144. Id. at 205.
145. Id. at 208.
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Iraq seems clear and reasonable under the circumstances.
In determining whether a reasonable State would take
preemptive action such as Israel did, Polebaum breaks down the
analysis into five elements. First, the decisionmakers must be aware
of a clear threat. "An opponent's vague threats to wage war should
be insufficient unless its present intention to use nuclear arms then or
in the future can be ascertained."'46 That element appears to be
satisfied. Second, "[t]he threatening nation must have acquired or
must have been acquiring nuclear capability.' ' 17 The facts show that
Iraq was close to making nuclear weapons, and none of the writers
cited herein refute this, not even those who claim the Israel's strike
violated international law. Third, the State carrying out the strike
must have:
acted at the last available moment for effective
action.... Even if relations between the two nations
had been tense, a preemptive attack would not have
been justified where the relations had undergone no
significant change. Such a strike would be justified
only if the defending nation reasonably believed that
further delay would have seriously compromised its
security or would have heightened the danger [to
civilians].
What had changed in 1981 was that the reactor used for extracting the
plutonium necessary to make the bomb was about to become
operational. Israel's assertion that attacking an operational nuclear
reactor would put the civilian population at risk appears reasonable.
Furthermore, to delay the strike until after the plutonium was already
extracted and spirited away would completely defeat the purpose of
preventing Iraq from making the bomb. Fourth, the State should act
affirmatively to seek a peaceful resolution.49 Israel had, since 1974,
expressed its concerns to France, who sold the reactor to Iraq, and to
the U.S.5 It was not possible for Israel to seek a peaceful solution
directly with Iraq, who did not recognize its existence and even
146. Polebaum, supra note 88, at 210.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 211.
149. Id. at 212.
150. MCCORMACK, supra note 46, at 108; Shoham, supra note 88, at 214-215.
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refused to negotiate with it. 5' Polebaum's fifth element, that the
strike must be strictly limited to the force necessary to remove the
nuclear threat,'52 will be discussed in the section dealing with the
appropriate remedy.
From the facts, all of which were known at the time of the attack,
it is evident that the prevailing question was not whether Iraq would
attack Israel with nuclear weapons, but when. Given its small size
and population, a single, well-placed nuclear explosion could so
cripple Israel that Iraq and other hostile States could then have easily
defeated its armed forces and occupied the country or worse. A mere
half-dozen nuclear explosions could eliminate most of the population,
making the annihilation of Israel inevitable. The injury to Israel was
the real and substantial reduction of its life expectancy to a few years.
Such an injury warranted the use of force as an appropriate remedy.
4. What was the appropriate remedy?
The discussion now turns to defining what remedy was
proportionate to Israel's injury. Certainly if Iraq actually had carried
out a nuclear attack on Israel, Israel's remedy would have been total
war against Iraq. Fortunately that did not happen, so the
proportionate remedy is something less than total war.
In defining the proportionality of a remedy to an armed attack
that has not yet occurred, it may be useful to draw an analogy to an
interest-bearing certificate of deposit. Suppose that the objective is to
have a $1000 payout when the CD expires. To achieve this objective
after only one year, it would be necessary to make a large deposit, say
$950. One could deposit much less, say $250, but the objective of
$1000 might take 20 years to be realized. Now suppose that the
objective of a nuclear attack on Israel is equivalent to the $1000, and
the point at which Iraq's nuclear program had progressed represents
$250 toward that goal. At that point in Iraq's investment, Israel's
remedy to its above-stated injury is not total war against Iraq, but
rather is limited to the destruction of the means for Iraq to carry out
the attack. Before the reactor goes on line, the amount of force
necessary to do this is equivalent to the $250 investment of Iraq.
After the reactor goes on line and begins producing plutonium, Iraq's
investment may have increased to $500 and the amount of force
proportional to the injury would correspondingly increase as well.
151. Shoham, supra note 88, at 205.
152. Polebaum, supra note 88, at 212.
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From an economy of force standpoint, it made sense for Israel to
destroy the reactor when it did, because waiting until Iraq's return on
its investment was larger would mean that the amount of force
required to destroy it would have had to be much greater as well.
The amount of force proportional to the injury is equivalent to the
"present value" of the injury, not the future value. From this
perspective, Israel's operation-destroying the nonoperational
reactor and nothing else-was the minimum amount of force
necessary '53 for Israel to secure its remedy to the injury caused by
Iraq's breach of its obligations. That remedy was the inability of Iraq
to attack Israel with nuclear weapons.
IV. Enough Is Enough: Operation Desert Fox
A. What Happened
On December 16-19, 1998, in a campaign known as "Operation
Desert Fox," U.S. and British forces conducted a series of strikes
against military targets in Iraq. The purpose of the operation was to
attack Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and "its ability to
threaten its neighbors."'' 4 The operation was in direct response to
Iraq's failure to cooperate with U.N. organs in disarming its WMDs.
The strikes were a culmination of a long-smoldering dispute over
Iraq's compliance with the disarmament scheme imposed on it by the
Security Council. By the terms of Security Council Resolution 687,
which the Council enacted as the "cease-fire agreement" after the
Gulf War, Iraq was required to submit to the total disarming of its
weapons of mass destruction (specifically nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons) and submit to on-site inspections.' Iraq was also
required to submit to the destruction of all its ballistic missiles with a
range greater than 150 kilometers.56 The inspection and verification
of the disarmament of the chemical and biological weapons and
ballistic missiles was to be carried out by a special commission
established by the Security Council (the United Nations Special
153. This is Polebaum's fifth element to her "reasonable State" analysis. Id. at
212.
154. Letter dated 16 December 1998 from the Charg6 d'Affairs a.i. of the United
States Mission to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1181 (Dec. 16, 1998).
155. S.C. Res. 687, 8-12 (1991).
156. Id. I 8(b).
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Commission, or UNSCOM)"' Iraq's nuclear program was subject to
the same regulations, a program that was to be carried out by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).'5' However, as the
pattern of conduct of Iraq since 1991 has clearly shown, Iraq never
had any intention of dismantling these programs59 and the
disarmament process, to say the least, has not gone well.
Far from complying with its disarmament obligations, Iraq
"chose to follow a course of denial, concealment and obstruction"
from the outset.'6" The specific instances of Iraq's deception are
already well documented in other sources.16' The following is a brief
157. Id. I 9(b)(i).
158. Id. T 13.
159. RICHARD BUTLER, THE GREATEST THREAT: IRAQ, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY 143-144 (2000). Mr. Butler
writes, "Iraq's behavior had made perfectly clear that Saddam's fundamental concern
was not relief from sanctions but to maintain weapons of mass destruction. If relief
from sanctions had been his main concern, he could have achieved that quickly, years
before, by cooperating with the disarmament requirements." Mr. Butler was the
Chairman of UNSCOM during the events leading up to and including Operation
Desert Fox. Mr. Butler's deputy, Charles Duelfer, writes, "Iraq believes these
weapons capabilities are highly valuable, perhaps essential, for its national security."
Charles Duelfer, Arms Reduction: The Role of International Organizations, the
UNSCOM Experience, 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 105,107 (2000).
160. Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051
(1996), 91 74, Appendix to Note by the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/1997/779 (Oct.
8, 1997). These are particularly strong words in the watered-down diplomatic
language of the U.N.
161. BUTLER, supra note 159; Duelfer, supra note 159; SCoTr RITTER, ENDGAME,
SOLVING THE IRAQ PROBLEM-ONCE AND FOR ALL (1999); Sean M. Condron,
Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis
of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115 (1999); Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner,
Bypassing the Security Council. Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires
and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1999); Nigel D. White &
Robert Cryer, Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat Too Far?, 29 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 243 (1999); UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, on
the U.N. website at
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2003) [hereinafter UNSCOM Chronology]. The reports of UNSCOM up to
Operation Desert Fox are in U.N. Docs. S/23165 (1991), S/23268 (1991), S/23801
(1992), S/24108 & Corr. 1 (1992), S/24661 (1992), S/24984 (1992), S/25620 (1993),
S/25977 (1993), S/26684 (1993), S/26910 (1993), S/1,994/489, S/1994/750, S/1994/1138 &
Corr. 1, S/1994/1422 & Add. 1, S/1995/284, S/1995/494, S/1995/864, S/1995/1038,
S/1996/258, S/1996/848, S/1997/301, S/1997/774, S/1998/332, S/1998/920, S/1998/995,
S/1998/1023, S/1998/1032, S/1998/1059, S/1998/1127, and S/1998/1172 & Corr. 1. The
reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with respect to
weapons inspection in Iraq, up to Operation Desert Fox are in U.N. Docs. S/23813
(1992), S/24722 (1992), S/25621 (1993), S/26685 (1993), S/1994/490, S/1994/1151,
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recounting of the events that finally led to Operation Desert Fox.
Iraq's course of subterfuge began immediately after the Gulf
War, when Iraq revealed to U.N. inspectors only a portion of its
WMD programs. Iraq declared only 10 of 19 mobile ballistic
launchers and only 45 of about 140 Al-Hussein long-range ballistic
missiles. Iraq revealed its program to modify its short-range Scud
missiles to the long-range Al-Husseins, but not its program for
indigenous development of long-range missiles. Iraq declared
"aspects" of its chemical weapon inventory and production
capabilities, but hid thousands of bombs and artillery shells
containing the deadly chemicals, including VX nerve gas which Iraq
had never acknowledged possessing. Iraq made no declarations at all
regarding its biological weapons program.'62 UNSCOM inspectors
believed Iraq had revealed about one-third of its WMD capability
and was concealing the remaining, more valuable aspects.'63
Confrontations between weapons inspectors and Iraqi officials
quickly ensued. A quite unamused Security Council passed
Resolution 707, demanding that Iraq "provide without further delay
full, final and complete disclosure.., of all aspects of its programmes
to develop weapons of mass destruction and [prohibited] ballistic
missiles, '164 allow UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors "immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities,
equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to
inspect,', 65 and "cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move or
destroy [prohibited] material or equipment ... without notification to
and prior consent of the Special Commission.'
66
The situation did not improve significantly. In January 1993,
Iraq threw up obstacles to UNSCOM aircraft landing in Iraqi
airfields, but relented after the U.S., Great Britain and France
conducted air strikes against Iraq. 67 In 1994, Iraq imposed a deadline
for completion of inspections, after which time it would cease
cooperating with UNSCOM, but relented after the U.S. began
S/1995/287, S/1995/604, S/1995/844, S/1996/261, S/1996/833, S/1997/297, S/1997/779,
S/1998/312, S/1998/694, S/1998/927, S/1998/1033, S/1998/1058, and S/1998/1172 &
Corr. 1 (a joint report with UNSCOM).
162. RITTER, supra note 161, at 33.
163. Duelfer, supra note 159, at 109.
164. S.C. Res. 707, $[ 3(a) (1991).
165. Id. $ 3(b).
166. Id. 91 3(c).
167. Duelfer, supra note 159, at 111.
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amassing forces in the region."6 In August 1995, Iraqi Lt. General
Hussein Kamel, who headed most of Iraq's WMD programs, defected
to Jordan and revealed to inspectors the true extent of the programs,
and how Iraq had successfully deceived UNSCOM1 69 Having already
filed three "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures" on the nature of
biological weapons program, Iraq was then forced to admit the much
greater extent of its programs.' Iraq spent most of 1996 and 1997
blocking UNSCOM access to inspection sites17' and making new and
consistently deficient "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures."'72
Following the expulsion of all United States nationals working for
UNSCOM from Iraq, UNSCOM withdrew all but a skeleton crew"3
and returned only after Iraq agreed to accept its full complement of
staff.
174
The series of crises leading to Operation Desert Fox began with
Iraq's refusal of access to certain sites on the basis that they were
"Presidential sites," and therefore out of bounds of UNSCOM
inspectors.'75 In November 1997, the U.S. and Great Britain began
deploying additional forces in the region.176 Iraq's non-cooperation,
as well as its blockage of access to eight "Presidential sites,"
continued through January 1998.'7 By February, the U.S. and Great
168. UNSCOM Chronology, supra note 161.
169. Duelfer, supra note 159, at 113.
170. UNSCOM Chronology, supra note 161.
171. Id.; see also Duelfer, supra note 159, at 114-115, and Iraq's Compliance with
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), Annex I to Report by
the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1997), U.N. Doc.
S/1997/774 (Oct. 6, 1997).
172. Findings of the international panel of experts on Iraq's full, final and complete
disclosure of its proscribed biological weapons programme, Annex II to U.N. Doc.
S/1997/774, supra note 171.
173. UNSCOM Chronology, supra note 161.
174. Id.
175. Id.; Report on the visit to Baghdad from 12 to 16 December 1997 by the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
under paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Annex to Letter
dated 17 December 1997 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/1997/987 (Dec. 17, 1997).
176. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at 256.
177. UNSCOM Chronology, supra note 161; Letter dated 22 January 1998 from the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to
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Britain were threatening to use force against Iraq unless its
Presidential sites were opened up to inspectors.' As a result, U.N.
Secretary-General Annan concluded a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with Iraq establishing special procedures for
inspecting the Presidential sites.179 The Security Council endorsed the
MOU,' thus averting strikes against Iraq. However, the subsequent
inspections of the sites did little to diffuse the crisis, for Iraq had
ample time to sanitize the sites and many buildings were virtually
empty, making it "clearly apparent that all sites had undergone
extensive evacuation. ' .8' A dispute over subsequent visits to the sites
immediately ensued; Iraq claimed the MOU was to permit one-time
visits only, contrary to the interpretation of the Secretary-General'82
and also contrary to the plain meaning of the text of the MOU.183 In
August 1998, Iraq declared its intention to cease all cooperation with
UNSCOM and the IAEA (except some monitoring) unless the
Security Council agreed to lift the oil embargo on Iraq, reorganize
UNSCOM and move its headquarters out of the United States."8 The
Security Council condemned the decision 85 and Iraq responded by,
halting the work of UNSCOM and IAEA altogether.'86 UNSCOM
and IAEA evacuated their personnel from Iraq.'87 Three days later,
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/58 (Jan. 22, 1998). These sites
were comprised of about 1500 buildings and some of them covered areas the size of
Washington, DC. Condron, supra note 161, at 172.
178. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at 261.
179. Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the
Republic of Iraq, in Letter dated 25 February 1998 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/166 (Feb. 25,
1998). The MOU established a "Special Group" of senior diplomats and technical
experts to carry out the inspections. Id. '1 4(a).
180. S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3858th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1154
(1998).
181. Initial entry to the presidential sites, Summary report of the Head of the Team,
para. 11, Appendix III to Letter dated 15 April 1998 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/326 (Apr. 15,
1998).
182. BUTLER, supra note 159, 144-151.
183. Iraq had agreed that the special procedures for entry into the Presidential
sites "shall apply to the initial and subsequent entries" into them. U.N. Doc.
S/1998/166, supra note 179, 4.
184. UNSCOM Chronology, supra note 161.
185. S.C. Res. 1194 (1998).
186. Duelfer, supra note 159, at 117.
187. Letter dated 11 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security
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Iraq very narrowly averted American air strikes against it by agreeing
to resume cooperation with both agencies."' Inspectors resumed
their work, but impediments to UNSCOM's work persisted. 9 On
December 15, 1998, the IAEA and UNSCOM transmitted their
reports of Iraqi cooperation; IAEA concluded that Iraq had been
cooperative'" but UNSCOM did not, reporting that "Iraq's conduct
ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of
disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons
programmes."'' After seven years, reported UNSCOM, "its
disclosure statement had never been complete" and "it [had] pursued
a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons."'9 2
Air strikes began the following day. UNSCOM and IAEA again
evacuated Iraq and did not return for nearly four years.
B. Legal Theories Justifying Operation Desert Fox
The reaction of the Security Council to Operation Desert Fox
underscores the deep divisions concerning how to deal with a roguish,
dangerous State such as Iraq. The Security Council met only once to
discuss the matter'93 and it did not vote on any resolution supporting
or condemning the strikes. Only three members (Russia, China and
Kenya) were of the opinion that the strikes were completely
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1059 (Nov. 11, 1998); Letter dated 11 November 1998 from
the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the
Secretary-General, Annex to Letter dated 11 November 1998 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1058
(Nov. 11, 1998).
188. Letter dated 14 November 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex to Letter dated 14 November 1998 from the
Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1078 (Nov. 14, 1998). Indeed, U.S. aircraft were already
en route to Iraq and were recalled when Iraq transmitted its decision. (The author
was the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate to the 4404th Wing (Provisional), now the
363rd Air Expeditionary Wing, in Saudi Arabia at the time of the operation.)
189. BUTLER, supra note 159, at 204.
190. Letter dated 14 December 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex I to Letter dated 15
December 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1172 (Dec. 15, 1998).
191. Letter dated 15 December 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Secretary-General, at 12,
Annex II to U.N. Doc. S/1998/1172, supra note 190.
192. Id. at 4.
193. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3955th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3955 (1998).
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unjustified.'94 Three members (Great Britain, United States and
Japan, two of which carried out the operation) declared not only that
Iraq had failed to live up to its obligations, but that the use of force
against Iraq without prior Security Council authorization was justified
because Iraq had breached Security Council Resolution 687, which
laid out the conditions of the cease-fire agreement with Iraq after the
Gulf War.9  Four members (Costa Rica, Slovenia, Sweden and
Brazil) agreed that Iraq was to blame for the crisis but the use of
force against Iraq should have been authorized by the Security
Council; 19 6 of those, two apparently would have been in favor of it.
19 7
Two other members (Portugal and France) neither supported nor
condemned the operation, but were both very critical of Iraq.'98 The
totality of the statements indicates that the Security Council actually
came down more harshly on Iraq than on the United States and Great
Britain.
Enforcement of a cease-fire agreement was the justification
presented officially for the operation. Writers on the subject
generally agree that Iraq was not in compliance with the disarmament
and inspection provisions of Security Council Resolution 687. The
Security Council itself had made such a finding on multiple
occasions." What writers generally do not agree upon is whether one
194. Id. at 4 (Russia); id. at 5 (China); id. at 12 (Kenya).
195. Id. at 6 (Great Britain); id. at 9 (U.S.), 11 (Japan). Great Britain also referred
to Security Council resolution 1154 (Mar. 2, 1998), which threatened the "severest
consequences" if Iraq did not cooperate with the inspectors. Of the three, only the
U.S. specifically invoked Security Council resolution 678 (1991) (which authorized
States to use "all necessary means" to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait) as the legal
authority to resume hostilities against Iraq.
196. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3955, supra note 193, at 7-8 (Costa Rica and Slovenia); id. at
10-11 (Sweden, Brazil).
197. Slovenia, like Great Britain, referred to the "severest consequences" threat of
Security Council resolution 1154. Id. at 8. Sweden explicitly stated that it would
have voted in favor of resolution authorizing force against Iraq. Id. at 10.
198. Id. at 8 (Portugal); id. at 12-13 (France). Of the remaining members, two
(Gambia and Gabon) were neither supportive nor condemnatory of the operation,
nor supportive nor critical of Iraq. Id. at 11 (Gambia); id. at 13 (Gabon). The
Permanent Representative of Bahrain (who presided over the meeting) did not make
a statement in his national capacity.
199. S.C. Res. 707, supra note 164; S.C. Res. 1060, U.N. SCOR., 51st Sess., 3672d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1060 (1996); S.C. Res. 1115, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3792d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1115 (1997); S.C. Res. 1134, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3826th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1134 (1997); S.C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3831st
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137 (1997); S.C. Res. 1154, supra note 180; S.C. Res. 1194,
supra note 185; S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3939th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1205 (1998).
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or a few states may act to enforce the cease-fire agreement
unilaterally, i.e. without prior, specific authorization from the Security
Council. Ruth Wedgwood supported unilateral force against Iraq,
asserting that the original cease-fire was actually between Iraq and
the coalition forces," of which the U.S. was the leader. "It is not
unreasonable to regard the terms of such a cease-fire as self-
executing, just as the violation of a newly settled boundary line or
demilitarized zone would entitle a neighboring state to act upon a
violation."2"' Under this theory the "coalition" (or rather, what was
left of it) had a legitimate basis for enforcing the agreement. This
position carries some support in Oppenheim's International Law, in
which a violation of an essential stipulation of a peace treaty creates a
right for the other party to cancel it202 (and consequently go to war).
It follows that the basis for going back to war would be the original
resolution, which authorized the coalition to war against Iraq in the
first place, i.e. Security Council Resolution 678.203 Sean Condron
arrives at a similar conclusion, but only after some hesitation and a
finding that the U.N. had acquiesced to the unilateral threat or use of
force by the United States against Iraq in the past."
The opposing view, taken by many other writers and which
appears to prevail among Member States of the Security Council, is
that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force to
enforce a Security Council resolution.2"5 For example, White and
Cryer assert that it was the Security Council who fought the Gulf War
against Iraq, and the Security Council who set forth the conditions to
200. Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The
Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 724,
726 (1998).
201. Id.
202. 2 OPPENI4EIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 616. The principle is
also embodied in Article 40 of the Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs of
War on Land, 36 Stat. 2295, 2305-2306 [hereinafter Hague Regulations], Annex to
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 6.
203. There would therefore be no need to rely on threats of "severest
consequences" such as that of resolution 1154, $ 3. Indeed, to do so would be
detrimental, given the statements of Council members that the resolution was not to
be construed as a specific authorization of force against Iraq. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3858th mtg. at 14-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3858 (1998).
204. Condron, supra note 161, at 178-180.
205. Michael L. Cornell, Comment, A Decade of Failure: The Legality and
Efficacy of United Nations Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 325 (2001); White & Cryer, supra note 161; Lobel &
Ratner, supra note 161.
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the cease-fire."' They argue that once Iraq agreed to the cease-fire
and the coalition withdrew its forces, the authorization to use force in
Resolution 678 was cancelled.2 7 Therefore, they argue, any use of
force to enforce Resolution 687 must be separately mandated; to
proceed otherwise is to "sanction the permanent delegation of
authority" of the Security Council to use force28 and such a
delegation of authority would be ultra vires. White and Cryer argue
further that the final paragraph of Resolution 687, which states that
the Council would "take such further steps as may be required for the
implementation of this resolution,''"9 is an indicator that the Council
intended that any enforcement action could only be carried out by the
Council210 (i.e. that the Resolution is not self-executing) and that
threatening language such as "serious consequences for non-
compliance" in subsequent resolutions is "too ambiguous to give the
airstrikes a firm legal basis." ''1 David Morriss, in his analysis of
multilateral armistice agreements, writes, "Although terms of the
armistice agreements dealing with important but collateral issues such
as verification regimes... may fail, the overriding obligation not to
resort to force as a means of dispute settlement is deemed severable
and continues to be binding." '12
This argument has several flaws. First, the authorization for the
coalition to use force against Iraq during the Gulf War flowed not
only from Security Council Resolution 678, but also from the inherent
right of self-defense as embodied in Article 51 of the Charter. Had
the Security Council never acted, the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait
and subsequent measures to disarm it would still have taken place on
a perfectly sound legal basis. Rather than the coalition acting as a
proxy for the Security Council, the Security Council was acting as a
validator for the coalition. The war and the subsequent cease-fire
were led not by the Security Council, but by the United States.
Second, the interpretation of Article 34 of Resolution 687 as a
206. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at 270. See also Lobel & Ratner, supra note
161, at 127.
207. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at 273. See also Lobel & Ratner, supra note
161, at 125.
208. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at 272.
209. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 155, at T 34.
210. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at 275.
211. Id. at 276.
212. David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and
the Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 822-823 (1996).
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statement that further steps from the Security Council would be
required to enforce it, reads language into the resolution that is not
there. The resolution stated that the Security Council would take
further steps to implement the resolution, e.g. approving inspection
plans, supervising the return of Kuwaiti property and repatriation of
Kuwaiti nationals, implementing a plan for reparations. Third, the
fact that the words "serious consequences" do not expressly mean air
strikes does not deprive them of a legal basis for other reasons.
Finally, the threats of force prior to Operation Desert Fox and the
use of force during the operation were not unilateral; other States,
most notably Great Britain, participated and the operations had the
political support of other States."' For these reasons, the author finds
the argument against the legality of Operation Desert Fox
unpersuasive.
Conventional jus ad bellum, however, does not present a
conclusive answer to the question, as the diverse opinions of States
and publicists have demonstrated. Condron, analyzing the problem
under the law of anticipatory self-defense and reprisals, finds the
former an inadequate justification for lack of imminency of attack"'
and the latter an adequate justification after applying D.W. Bowett's
preconditions for reprisals."5 This author, on the other hand,
disagrees with both of Condron's conclusions: as the discussion of the
Israeli strike on Osiraq has shown, there is precedent for relaxing the
imminency requirement of anticipatory self-defense when weapons of
mass destruction are involved, and the doctrine of "reprisals" in post-
Charter jus ad bellum is both unnecessary and dangerous."6 At the
end of the day, the questions remain.
C. Operation Desert Fox as a Remedy to an Injury
Under the theory presented at the beginning of this work, when a
State breaches an obligation to another State, and that breach results
213. E.g. Japan's support of Operation Desert Fox, supra note 195. White &
Cryer themselves acknowledge that the threat of force during the crisis of February
1998 had the political support of about 20 States. White & Cryer, supra note 161, at
243.
214. Condron, supra note 161, at 150.
215. Id. at 164. Bowett presented his preconditions in Bowett, Reprisals Involving
Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972).
216. See Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September lth: State
Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Response, 11 CARD. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 35-
37 (2003).
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in an injury to the other State, the injured State has the right to a
remedy from the State that breached its obligation. Although the
backdrop for the application of this theory is the events leading up to
and including Operation Desert Fox, the approach is as germane to
the current debate of going to war with Iraq as it is to the events of
five years ago.
1. Iraq's legal obligations
Iraq was under a variety of legal obligations not to develop
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and to dismantle its existing
capabilities in those areas. Iraq's treaty-based obligations regarding
nuclear weapons have been documented in the previous section on
Osiraq. Iraq is also a party to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, which
prohibits the wartime use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and all analogous liquids, materials and devices."7 This Protocol also
prohibits the "use of bacteriological methods of warfare.,
218
Although the 1925 Gas Protocol proscribes the use of gaseous and
bacteriological weapons, it places no restrictions on the development
and stockpiling of such weapons. However, Iraq is also a party to the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention,219 which it ratified after the
Gulf War..2  Article I of the Convention reads:
217. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, Geneva, 26
U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter 1925 Gas Protocol]. Iraq acceded to the Gas
Protocol on September 8, 1931, with two reservations: (1) that Iraq is bound by the
Protocol only towards other parties to it; and (2) that Iraq is not bound toward
enemy States whose armed forces, or the armed forces of their allies, do not respect
the Protocol. E-mail from Francis J. Hollaran, Depositary Officer, Office of the
Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State to the author
(Nov. 12, 2002, 10:54 a.m. EST) (on file with author). The Gas Protocol has a great
many parties, including the United States and all of its NATO allies, the USSR (now
Russia), China, Japan, both Koreas, India and Pakistan. All the States in the Middle
East are parties (including Iran and Israel), except for Oman and the United Arab
Emirates. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2002).
218. Gas Protocol, supra note 217.
219. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention].
220. Iraq deposited its ratification of the Convention on April 18, 1991. E-mail
from State Department, supra note 91. Iraq ratified the Convention in response to
paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 687, in which the Council "invite[d]" Iraq
to do so. Because Security Council Resolution 687 was the cease-fire agreement
ending the Gulf War, the circumstances raise the question of whether Iraq was
coerced into acceding to the Convention. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on
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Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never
in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or
otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile
purposes or in armed conflict.22'
Article II of the Convention requires States to "destroy, or to divert
to peaceful purposes... all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and
means of delivery.., which are in its possession or under its
jurisdiction or control. ''22 Iraq is not a party to the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention,23 and therefore the treaty-based prohibitions
on developing and stockpiling chemical weapons, as well as the use of
non-gaseous weapons, do not apply to it.
However, Iraq, like all nations, remained bound under
customary international law to observe certain restrictions on its
conduct in warfare. The customary law of war (jus in bello) prohibits
attacks on civilians2 . and attacks "which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life [or] injury to civilians... which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." '225 The use of certain weapons, biological weapons in
the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, renders a treaty void if procured by the threat or
use of force. However, the threat or use of force must have been in violation of the
Charter. Since the use of force was justified under Article 51 of the Charter, as well
as authorized by Security Council Resolution 678, the cease-fire agreement (and
Iraq's accession to the Convention) is not rendered void for coercion.
221. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 219, art. 1.
222. Id. art. 2.
223. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
(1993).
224. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51, 2, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
225. Id. art. 51, 1 5(b). Notwithstanding that neither Iraq nor the U.S. are parties
to the Protocol, the principles of military necessity and proportionality embodied in
them are generally regarded as reaffirmations of customary international law.
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particular, violates this principle because they are so indiscriminate as
to pose a significant danger to the civilian population, if they are
directed toward enemy combatants and other lawful targets.226 The
prohibition of targeting civilians is not limited to weapons of mass
destruction. Iraq, like all States, had the obligation not to
deliberately target civilian populations using conventional weapons,
or to use such weapons in a manner that does not adequately
distinguish between a legitimate military objective and the civilian
population. For example, if Iraq intended to attack a military target
with long-range ballistic missiles, it had a duty to ensure that the
missile has a reasonably good chance of hitting that target. To fire a
missile at a certain target knowing that it has only a slim chance of
hitting it would be unlawful.
Iraq also had specific obligations imposed on it by the Security
Council. In Resolution 687, the Security Council imposed the
following duties on Iraq:
Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction,
removal, or rendering harmless, under international
supervision, of
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks
of agents and all related subsystems and components
and all research, development, support and
manufacturing facilities related thereto;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than [150]
kilometres, and related major parts and repair and
production facilities;
22 7
The Security Council also decided that "Iraq shall unconditionally
undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items
specified [above]. 228  Regarding Iraq's program for developing
nuclear weapons, the Council imposed the following obligations on
Iraq:
Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or
226. Admittedly the same cannot necessarily be said of certain types of chemical
weapons that disperse and evaporate so quickly that the chemicals are rendered
harmless within an hour of delivery.
227. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 155, at 8.
228. Id. 1 10.
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develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable
material or any subsystems or components or any
research, development, support or manufacturing
facilities related to the above.229
Security Council Resolution 687 thus completely bans Iraq from
possessing or developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.230
Resolution 687 also imposed on Iraq several duties designed to
ensure its compliance with the proscriptions enumerated above. The
Council ordered Iraq to submit "a declaration on the locations,
amounts and types of all items specified [above], 231' and to submit to
on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile
capabilities, with the objective of destroying or rendering harmless
those programs.3 2 In the nuclear arena, Iraq was required:
to submit ... a declaration of the locations, amounts
and types of all items specified above; to place all of its
nuclear-weapon-usable materials under the exclusive
control, for custody and removal, of [the IAEA]... ;
to accept.., urgent on-site inspection and the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless ... of all
items specified above; and to accept ... future ongoing
monitoring and verification of its compliance with
these undertakings.233
After initial Iraqi recalcitrance, the Security Council clarified these
obligations in Resolution 707, demanding that Iraq "provide... full,
final and complete disclosure ... of all aspects of its programmes to
develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a
range greater than [150] kilometres," '234 and further demanded that
Iraq allow UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors "immediate, unrestricted
and unconditional access"235 and to cease all attempts to conceal or
229. Id. T 12.
230. The resolution makes no mention of radiological weapons, which are the
other category of weapons of mass destruction.
231. Id. T 9(a).
232. Id. TT 9(a)-9(b).
233. Id. T 12.
234. S.C. Res. 707, supra note 164, T 3(a).
235. Id. T 3(b).
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relocate items of interest. 36
Both resolutions 687 and 707, as well as all subsequent
resolutions on Iraqi disarmament, were enacted under Chapter VII of
the Charter. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the
authority to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain and
restore international peace and security. 37 Members of the United
Nations have the obligation to "accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council."238 Iraq, being a member of the United Nations,
had the affirmative duty to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. Furthermore, as members of the Security Council have
asserted and writers on Operation Desert Fox have acknowledged,
Security Council Resolution 687 constituted a cease-fire agreement,239
which Iraq accepted in writing.2 ' The agreement was therefore
binding on Iraq and the principle of pacta sunt servanda required that
Iraq perform its provisions in good faith. 4'
2. Iraq has breached its obligations
Iraq violated every obligation mentioned above, and worse, tried
to deceive the Security Council into believing that it was in fact in
236. Id. 3(c).
237. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
238. Id. art. 25.
239. Resolution 687 states that "upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-
General and the Security Council of its acceptance of the above provisions, a formal
cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating
with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990)." S.C. Res. 687, supra note
155, 33.
240. Identical letters dated 6 April 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Iraq addressed respectively to the Secretary-General and the President of
the Security Council, Annex to UN Doc. S/22456 (1991). At page 7, Iraq states that
"it has no choice but to accept this resolution." The extremely bellicose, grudging and
unrepentant tone of the letter calls into question whether Iraq entered into this
agreement voluntarily. Writers disagree on this question. Duelfer, for example, does
not view the resolution as an arms control agreement. Duelfer, supra note 159, at
107. Wedgwood, however, does regard the cease-fire as an agreement. Wedgwood,
supra note 200, at 725-26. The prevailing viewpoint in the Security Council is that it
is an agreement; indeed, the fact that Iraq sent an identical letter to the persons
stated in the resolution, specifically referencing the resolution, is a strong indicator
that Iraq intended to derive the benefit of a cease-fire from it. Iraq could not,
therefore, subsequently claim that it had not accepted the resolution as a cease-fire
agreement.
241. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 26. An
identical provision appears in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, but that treaty has not entered into force.
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compliance. Instead of dismantling its nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons programs, Iraq made considerable efforts to
continue its development of nuclear weapons technology, and to
retain its chemical warheads and ballistic missile components. Iraq
also made considerable efforts to hide equipment and documentation
from U.N. inspectors, in a deliberate campaign to deceive the
Security Council. The details of the above have already been
presented 2 Iraq never disclosed the full extent of its biological and
2431 244chemical weapons programs, or its nuclear program. To say that
Iraq did not perform its treaty obligations or its obligations under
Security Council resolutions in good faith is a gross understatement.
A few incidents not fully described above reveal how complete
Iraq's bad faith actually was. In June 1991, only two months after the
cease-fire, IAEA inspectors caught Iraqi officials trying to remove
Calutron electromagnetic isotope separators, which were components
of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Inspectors pursued the
officials and were shot at in the process. 5 In September 1991, IAEA
inspectors found millions of pages of documents on Iraq's nuclear
program. After a four-day standoff, Iraqi security services forcibly
removed the documents from the inspectors.246 In March 1992, Iraq
claimed it had unilaterally destroyed many of its missiles, munitions
and production tools. Iraq had in fact destroyed some of them (but
not all it said it had), without UNSCOM supervision, in order to
remove any trace of evidence of Iraq's previous program and to
invalidate any evidence inspectors may have had about Iraq's
previous false statements. UNSCOM inspectors tried to physically
verify Iraq's declaration of unilateral destruction but they found a
significant shortfall. Iraq then claimed that what the inspectors found
242. See supra notes 159-192 and accompanying text.
243. Annex II to U.N. Doc. S/1998/1172, supra note 191, at 4.
244. A 1998 status report from the IAEA reads, ". . . the provision of information
by Iraq has seldom, if ever, been voluntary, and Iraq's cooperation in this regard has
never approached full transparency." Interim Status Report of the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency in response to the Presidential statement on
Iraq of 14 May 1998, para. 4, Appendix to Letter dated 27 July 1998 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1998/694 (July 27, 1998).
245. RITTER, supra note 161, at 108-109. Richard Butler has been highly critical of
Ritter's book, asserting that his facts are "rarely accurate." BUTLER, supra note 159,
at 179. However, Ritter was in a better position to describe first-hand the course of
various inspections, and therefore in those matters Ritter's text will be taken as
equally authoritative.
246. RITrER, supra note 161, at 111-112.
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was only part of the total; the rest had been melted into ingots (which,
naturally, were unverifiable as to their origin). UNSCOM requested
documentation of this and Iraq claimed there was none.247 In July
1992, Iraq denied access to a building containing 1.5 million pages of
key documents. UNSCOM inspectors cordoned off the building and
remained there in order to prevent their clandestine removal. As the
standoff wore on, thousands of Iraqi civilians began pelting the
inspectors' cars with eggs and vegetables and threatened them with
knives and skewers. Faced with threats to their safety, the inspectors
withdrew and returned several days later to find nothing in the
buildings; the documents had been removed.248  Obviously the
demonstration had been carried out at the behest of Iraqi
government, for such a large public gathering and extensive public
disorder could not have taken place in such a repressive regime, so
close to a sensitive government facility, without government
complicity.
This breed of "compliance" continued throughout the seven
years that inspections took place. For example, after the defection of
Hussein Kamel,249 the Iraqi government "discovered" 1.5 million
pages of documents on Hussein Kamel's chicken farm and claimed
that he had continued the biological weapons program without
authority. °
In 1998, Iraq's concealment techniques became more brazen. In
March 1998, UNSCOM's Concealment Investigations Unit
intercepted communications revealing that Iraq's Special Security
Organization had evacuated material from sites in advance, or
created delays until material was withdrawn, proving what inspectors
had long suspected.25' In June 1998, UNSCOM inspectors discovered
traces of VX nerve gas, which Iraq for years had denied ever
producing, on metal fragments from destroyed Iraqi Scud warheads.
When confronted with the evidence, Iraq admitted to producing VX,
but claimed it had made only 200 liters of it and then unilaterally
destroyed it. UNSCOM had evidence that Iraq had in fact made
almost 20 times that amount. Right after revealing the findings to
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, UNSCOM Executive Chairman
247. Id. at 34-36.
248. Id. at 36-37.
249. See note 169 and accompanying text.
250. RITIER, supra note 161, at 47.
251. Id. at 18.
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Richard Butler contracted a strange illness and he has suspicions that
he was poisoned (though a blood test was inconclusive).252 In
December 1998, an UNSCOM inspector was shown an empty
building, that had obviously been sanitized, while Iraqi authorities
"stood about laughing and saying, 'What else did you expect? That
we would show you anything serious?' 253 The award for the most
disgustingly pathetic attempt at deception goes to an incident in
March 1998. At the close of a particularly tense meeting between
Butler and Aziz, Aziz hauled in a visibly terrified Iraqi civilian who
had no blemishes on his arm-as proof that Iraq was not testing
biological weapons on human beings.2 54  The evidence that Iraq
breached its obligations to dismantle its programs on weapons of
mass destruction in the worst faith imaginable is overwhelming.
3. What is the injury?
The fact that Iraq's compliance with its obligations was so
unsatisfactory did not warrant the use of force against Iraq in and of
itself. For the use of force to be an appropriate response, the injury
to other States must have been so severe that the use of force was
necessary to secure a proportionate remedy. The Caroline formula of
anticipatory self-defense could not be applied to Operation Desert
Fox, for it could not be shown that an armed attack was imminent.
Furthermore, Iraq apparently was much further away from
developing a nuclear weapon than it was when Israel struck Osiraq in
1981, so even under the relaxed standard of imminency for nuclear
weapons, the justification of anticipatory self-defense was
questionable.
The injury that justified the use of force against Iraq in 1998 was
the substantial likelihood that if Iraq's programs for developing
weapons of mass destruction went unchecked, it would eventually use
them against other States. Iraq's propensity to do so was
demonstrated by its prior record of aggression. As shown in the
previous section on Osiraq, Iraq had taken the hardest line against
Israel's right to exist and in favor of its annihilation.255 Iraq used
252. BUTLER, supra note 159, at 159-161. In response to Iraqi accusation of U.S.
bias against it, other samples were taken from the same site for further testing; a
Swiss lab found no VX and a French lab "reported somewhat ambiguous outcomes
that might have been consistent with presence of VX." Id. at 177.
253. Id. at 206.
254. Id. at 1-4.
255. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
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mustard gas and tabun (a nerve agent) against Iranian forces during
the Iran-Iraq war from 1983 to 1988.256 Iraq also used mustard gas
against Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq in late March 1988.257 In
March of 1990, the U.S. detected missile launch sites in western Iraq
that were aimed at Israel.2"  Authorities also intercepted an Iraq-
bound shipment that contained high-grade steel tubes for building a
"supergun" designed to fire warheads to targets up to 1000 kilometers
away."' In August 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait,
precipitating the Gulf War. During the occupation of Kuwait, Iraqi
forces looted and pillaged the country, and hundreds of Kuwaitis
disappeared.2' During the same period, Iraq fired Scud missiles
indiscriminately at Israel, which was not even a member of the
coalition.6 In the course of their withdrawal from Kuwait at the end
of the Gulf War, Iraqi forces set fire to hundreds of Kuwaiti oil
wells.262 The same "gang of despicable liars and cheats 263 in power
during the foregoing incidents remained in power at the time of
Operation Desert Fox. Iraq was at the time the single most
aggressive and dangerous State in the Middle East.
Military assessments of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction were similarly downbeat. Tony Cordesman
256. From 1984 to 1988 a team of experts appointed by the Secretary-General
investigated and reported on allegations that Iraq had used chemical weapons during
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The team concluded that Iraqi forces had used chemical
weapons on Iranian forces, Iranian civilians, and Iraqi civilians. U.N. Doc. S/16433
(1984); U.N. Doc. S/17127 (1985); U.N. Doc. S/17911 (1986); U.N. Doc. S/18852
(1987); U.N. Doc. S/19823 (1988). In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was the first to use
force against Iran, launching attacks on Iranian air bases in September 1980. IRAQ
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 1, at 233. However, on the question of identifying the
original aggressor in the Iran-Iraq War, this author is willing to give Iraq the benefit
of the doubt, for Ayatollah Khomeini had embarked on a campaign to export Islamic
revolution to other States, particularly the Shi'ite minority population in Iraq. Iran
thus posed a genuine threat to Iraq.
257. U.N. Doc. S/19823, supra note 256.
258. RiTTER, supra note 161, at 98.
259. Id. at 99.
260. DeSaussure, supra note 2, at 53-54.
261. Id. at 55-56. Major DeSaussure noted that the Circular Error Probable
(CEP) of Iraq's Scuds was 1000 meters, meaning that about half of them were
expected to land within 1000 meters of their targets, and therefore that the use of
such inaccurate missiles could only be justified against large military targets in
sparsely populated areas. Id. at 55.
262. Id. at 57.
263. Richard Butler recounts how his predecessor at UNSCOM had characterized
the Iraqi leadership. BUTLER, supra note 159, at 65.
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estimated in 1994 that once freed from UN controls, Iraq could
recover a "significant capability" to use chemical weapons in a major
land war within five years. 64 In the area of biological weapons,
Cordesman theorized that a single Scud missile with a full payload of
botulinum toxin could contaminate an area of 3700 square kilometers
and kill in as little as 12 hours. Anthrax could kill an even larger
area.166 "At some point in the near future, it would recover the ability
to fire Scuds with chemical warheads, and at some point in the near-
term, it would recover the ability to use aircraft and artillery to
deliver large volumes of chemical bombs and ordnance.
2 67
Some authors have questioned whether Iraq's forces were strong
enough to pose a real threat. UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter
opined that the Iraqi army (in 1999) was in "total disarray"26 and that
the Republican Guard remained an effective fighting force but could
not operate too far from its supply, and was therefore not a serious
international threat.269 Ritter assessed the Iraqi Air Force as being no
match for any modern air force.2" Although Iraq's army had been
significantly degraded by and after the Gulf War, and may not have
been very effective against Western forces, it remained the superior
land force in the region.27' The Iraqi air force was probably
defeatable by Turkey or Saudi Arabia (perhaps with U.S. assistance)
once reconstituted.272 The threat from Iraq's navy was negligible.273
However, in order to pose a regional threat, Iraq need not
militarily defeat the U.S. or other western powers, only its immediate
neighbors. The many scenarios of open conflict included low-level
conflict with Turkey and Iran, war with the Kurdish and Shi'ite
minorities within Iraq, confrontation with Syria over its peace
agreement with Israel, attacks against Persian Gulf shipping, and
unconventional attacks on U.S. facilities or ships in the region.274 It is
264. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, IRAN AND IRAQ: THE THREAT FROM THE
NORTHERN GULF 254 (1994).
265. Id. at 256.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 273.
268. RiTTER, supra note 161, at 199.
269. Id. at 200. Ritter notes that the Republic Guard was "decimated in a matter
of hours once it engaged the U.S. Army in 1991." Id.
270. Id.
271. CORDESMAN, supra note 264, at 199.
272. Id. at 219.
273. Id. at 224.
274. Id. at 283.
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the unconventional attacks that posed the greatest danger, especially
if such attacks involved biological or chemical weapons. The relative
weakness of its conventional forces gave Iraq a "strong incentive" to
carry out such an attack by unconventional means and "[s]enior Iraqi
leaders have.., been quite clear about their desire for revenge in
their discussions with Arab leaders, and Tariq Aziz has stated that it
is dishonorable to leave revenge to one's sons. 2 175 Using terrorists
and other proxies to carry out its revenge was far more feasible-and
safe-than doing so by means of a large-scale military action. 76 Used
in this manner, a few hundred weapons of mass destruction could
have been highly effective, particularly if Iraq used human couriers to
deliver them into population centers.77 The potential for covert
attacks, by regular forces or by terrorists with Iraqi sponsorship, was
enormous. Even in its weakened state, Iraq was a significant threat to
the security of many other States, even to those who could defeat it
militarily.
4. The appropriate remedy
In determining the appropriate remedy to the injury, several
questions must be addressed. First, who decides what the remedy
shall be? Second, what remedy is proportional to the injury?
It is useful to draw from the international law on
countermeasures in determining who should decide the appropriate
remedy to the injury. Article 49 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility provides that "[a]n injured State may only take
countermeasures against the State which is responsible for an
international wrongful act." '78 When that injury is a material breach
of a bilateral agreement,279 the expressly designated countermeasure is
the non-performance of international obligations of the injured State
toward the breaching State.2 ° More specifically, "[a] material breach
of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Condron, supra note 161, at 146. He cites the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the
Tokyo subway system with sarin nerve gas as an example.
278. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 49, para. 1.
279. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a material breach of a
treaty as either a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the Convention, or the
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of
the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 60, T 3.
280. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 49, 2.
2003]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its
operation in whole or in part. '  When the injury is a "serious
violation" of an armistice, the other party has the right to denounce
the armistice, "and even, in cases of urgency,... recommenc[e]
hostilities immediately.""2 2  When these two principles are put
together, the result is that a material breach of an armistice by one
party entitles the other party to suspend or terminate all or part of the
armistice, and resume the use of force when necessary.
When the injury involves a material breach of a multilateral
treaty, the situation becomes more complex. In such a case, three
possibilities ensue. First, all other parties may suspend or terminate
the treaty as between themselves and the breaching State, or as
between all the parties. Second, a party specially affected by the
breach may suspend or terminate it as between itself and the
breaching State. Third, if the breach radically changes the positions
of all the other parties, then any other State may suspend the
application of the treaty to itself.283 In the case of Desert Fox, Iraq's
material breach of the NPT, the Gas Protocol and the BWC, and the
consequent threat of Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction, was
so severe that the positions of all the members of the coalition were
radically changed. In addition, certain States (including the United
States) were specially affected by the breach because of the greater
likelihood that they or their forces would be the object of an attack
with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. However one arrives at this
result, the common conclusion is that the State entitled to choose and
implement its remedy to the wrongful act is that which suffered the
injury.
Iraq was also in material breach of Security Council resolution
687. If the resolution is construed as an order of the Security Council,
then a breach might cause injury to the Security Council, but almost
certainly would cause greater injury to other States, particularly
against those that Iraq would threaten. If the resolution is construed
as an international agreement (i.e. an armistice or cease-fire) between
Iraq and the coalition, then it is the coalition that may exercise the
prerogative to resume the war in order to enforce the terms of the
cease-fire agreement. Other States injured by Iraq's breach may also
seek remedies. If the resolution is construed as a cease-fire
281. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 60, 1.
282. Hague Regulations, supra note 202, art. 40.
283. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 60, 2.
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agreement between Iraq and the Security Council21A then the
prerogative to enforce the terms of the agreement is the Security
Council's. However, the failure for political reasons of the Security
Council either to authorize or prohibit remedial action cannot be
allowed to preempt other States, which are injured by Iraq's breach,
from taking necessary and appropriate remedies when the severity of
the injury warrants it, including the use of force.
In all of the alternatives described above, the result is the same-
the injured State(s) decides on and implements the remedy. This
does not mean, of course, that States should have unfettered
discretion in doing so, for a State that commits an act that would be
wrongful but for its being a remedy to a wrongful act by another
State, does so at its own risk. A State's assessment of its injury and its
decision to use force must be reasonable; it must act in conformity
with the actions of other prudent, similarly situated States. This
reasonableness standard also applies in the execution of the remedy.
In the area of execution of the remedy, i.e. the use of force
against Iraq, some writers have been critical of the United States.
Whereas on one hand, some contend that the U.S. went too far by
using force against Iraq, Condron and Ritter both contend that the
U.S. did not go far enough. Condron notes that Operation Desert
Fox targeted command centers, missile batteries and airfields, but not
the weapons of mass destruction themselves for fear of injuring the
civilian population.285 Ritter claims that Desert Fox targeted little
more than empty buildings."6 Given the stated objectives of the
operation, which were "attacking Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programmes and its ability to threaten its neighbors, ' it would seem
that the operation was not successful. While it is true that Iraq has
not seriously threatened to attack its neighbors since Desert Fox, it is
also true that U.N. inspectors were not allowed into Iraq for the next
four years, and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs
therefore went without any serious monitoring from December 1998
until December 2002. Indeed, the United Kingdom claimed that
Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs continued to
284. This author would not construe the agreement in this manner, as discussed in
section IV(B) infra.
285. Condron, supra note 161, at 123.
286. RITrER, supra note 161, at 29.
287. U.N. Doc. S/1998/1181, supra note 154.
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thrive.' Operation Desert Fox did not stop Iraq from developing
these weapons.
Although the decision to use force in response to Iraq's breach of
its obligation was correct, the United States did not pursue all the
right objectives. If the breach consisted of Iraq retaining and
developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and the
injury was the substantial threat that Iraq would eventually use such
weapons against its enemies, then the proportionate remedies should
have been (1) to destroy the existing weapons and programs to
develop such weapons; (2) destroy Iraq's ability to use force against
other States; and (3) secure the ability of UNSCOM and IAEA to
meaningfully monitor Iraq's ability to develop such weapons in the
future. The return of weapons inspectors was not among the reasons
the United States presented in its justification of Desert Fox,289 and
the operation did not force Iraq to readmit the inspectors. If the
objective were to destroy Iraq's WMD programs, the U.S. and UK
should have done so decisively and comprehensively, striking
factories, research facilities, and the weapons themselves in a
sustained campaign until Iraq relented. Yet the strikes ended after
only four days. If the objective were to destroy Iraq's ability to
threaten other states, then Iraq's conventional forces and their
weapons should also have been targeted. Ritter writes that one of the
targets was the 81h Battalion of the Special Republican Guard, which
had played a key role in Iraq's concealment operations. However,
Ritter claims that their armories, ammunition and vehicles were not
targeted.2' Targeting the forces involved in the concealment was not
militarily necessary and suggests that the U.S.'s true motive may have
been to "punish" Iraq for its deception. That is not an appropriate
remedy, for just as a countermeasure should be for the purpose of
inducing the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations,291 a
288. Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - The assessment of the British
Government (Sept. 24, 2002) 17, on the British Prime Minister's website at
http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page271.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) [hereinafter
British Iraq Dossier].
289. The UK stated its objective to Operation Desert Fox as "compliance by the
Iraqi leadership with the obligations laid down by the Council." Letter dated 16
December 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1182 (1998). However, it does not expressly
mention the return of inspectors.
290. RrTTER, supra note 161, at 196-197.
291. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 49, 91 1.
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remedy to an injury should be for the purpose of inducing the
wrongdoing State to cease the injury and make amends. Operation
Desert Fox did not achieve this and, given its brevity, appears to
never have been intended to achieve this. Although the entitlement
to use force against Iraq was clearly there, its execution was far off
the mark and for the next four years Iraq was allowed to continue its
WMD programs with relative impunity.
IV. To War Or Not To War? Or, "There He Goes Again."
Against the foregoing historical background, this article now
turns to the million-dinar question of 2003: the legality of a war with
Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party from power
there. Although the Security Council did not specifically authorize
the use of force against Iraq, the United States indicated that it would
use force unilaterally if necessary2 92 and ultimately did so.
Consequently the overriding question for international lawyers is
whether the unilateral use of force to effect regime change in Iraq was
permitted in international law, in the absence of an armed attack on
the United States or its allies.
A hasty reading of the U.N. Charter would lead to the conclusion
that a unilateral war against Iraq would not be permitted. Article
2(1) of the Charter reaffirms the Westphalian principle of sovereign
equality of States, a legal norm that proscribes interference in another
State's internal affairs. Article 2(4) reaffirms the post-World War
norm of renunciation of the use of force in international relations.
However, to look solely to the Charter for guidance is to grossly
oversimplify the issue.
A. Making Sausage: How the Security Council (Mis)Handled the
Crisis
Iraq's retention and continuing development of weapons of mass
destruction was at the forefront of the threat posed by that country,
and was particularly central to the debates in the Security Council
and the resulting resolution passed in November 2002. After
292. Text of President Bush's Address to U.N., WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2002, at
A31 ("We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions, but
the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council
resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or
action will be unavoidable, and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its
power").
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President Bush's speech in the General Assembly, and at the behest
of South Africa,293 the Security Council convened an open meeting
where non-member States and several regional organizations were
invited to present their views on the subject." The large majority of
States took the position that it is imperative that Iraq comply fully
with the provisions of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement (Security
Council resolution 687) and disarm its weapons of mass destruction.
In a statement read at the open meeting, the Secretary-General
referred to the upcoming Security Council resolution as Iraq's "last
chance."295 However, only a few States, mostly U.S. allies, suggested
that Iraq's non-compliance with Security Council resolutions should
have "serious consequences, 291 (a euphemism for military action). In
contrast, Russia made it very clear that it opposed the use of force
against Iraq2 97 and most of the Arab States used the debate as yet
another forum for bashing.Israel.9 France expressed its desire for a
two-tiered approach, the first stage being that the Security Council
enact a resolution setting forth what it expects from Iraq. Should
inspectors report Iraqi non-compliance, then the Security Council
would then meet a second time to decide on its response.'"
The French approach prevailed. On November 8, 2002, the
Council passed resolution 1441,"" determining that Iraq "has been
and remains in material breach of its obligations" to dismantle its
WMD programs."" Using tougher words than in the past, the
resolution was written to give Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply
with its obligations. However, the resolution did not automatically
293. Letter dated 10 October 2002 from the Permanent Representative of South
Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/1132 (2002).
294. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4625th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 & Resumptions 1-
3 (Oct. 16-17, 2002).
295. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625, supra note 294, at 4.
296. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 Resumption 1, supra note 294, at 10 (Australia); id. at
14 (Denmark); id. at 17 (New Zealand); id. at 19 (Argentina); id. at 22 (Canada);
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 Resumption 3 at 15 (Norway). Of these States, only Norway is
a member of the Security Council.
297. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 Resumption 3, supra note 294, at 22.
298. E.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625, supra note 294, at 14 (Yemen); id. at 15 (Algeria);
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 Resumption 2, supra note 294, at 9 (Lebanon); id. at 18-19
(Saudi Arabia); U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 Resumption 3, supra note 294, at 7 (Syria).
299. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 Resumption 3, supra note 294, at 13.
300. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002).
301. Id. $ 1.
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authorize the use of force to enforce it."° Only at the very end, almost
as an afterthought, did the Council warn Iraq of the "serious
consequences" of non-compliance, and then the Council merely
"recall[ed]" its repeated warnings of the past. °3
The wording and approach of resolution 1441 was a political
defeat for the United States, for despite the tough wording of the
resolution and the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to
"face its responsibilities,"3" the Security Council seemed unlikely to
expressly authorize any use of force against Iraq. The procedure set
forth in the resolution for responding to Iraqi delicts was cumbersome
and open to political manipulation. The resolution directed the heads
of UNMOVIC and IAEA to report Iraqi violations," and the heads
of those agencies potentially faced immense political pressure from
various States to issue reports favorable towards their
predispositions." Even if Iraqi violations were reported, it seemed
unlikely that the Security Council would be able to pass a resolution
authorizing military force, for one permanent member (Russia) had
already expressly declared its opposition to the use of force.3 7 It was
evident that the Council as a whole was unwilling to condone the use
of force against Iraq without its express authorization. On February 5
the Russian Foreign Minister confirmed the Security Council's
collective intent that such force would require an additional
resolution: "we cannot rule out the possibility that at some stage the
Security Council may need to adopt a new resolution, or perhaps
more than one resolution. 30 8 At the same meeting China and Chile
took similar positions."
302. Several members of the Council reiterated this point in the discussion after
the vote. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644 (2002).
303. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, 1 13.
304. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625, supra note 294, at 4.
305. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, 11.
306. Richard Butler claims he was under such pressure from Russian Foreign
Minister Primakov in November 1997 and again from Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov in December 1998. BUTLER, supra note 159, at 106-107 and 202-203.
307. See note 297 and accompanying text.
308. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701st mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003).
309. Id. at 18 (China); id. at 30 (Chile).
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B. A Forcible Regime Change in Iraq Is Justified and Necessary
1. Iraq's Duty
It has already been shown that Iraq had a duty under Security
Council resolution 687 to fully disclose its WMD capabilities,
dismantle its WMD programs, and cooperate with U.N. inspectors
sent to verify and monitor Iraq's compliance with these obligations.31
Iraq's obligation had been reaffirmed in several subsequent
resolutions."' The most recent affirmation, resolution 1441, imposed
several specific obligations on Iraq. By December 7, 2002, Iraq was
to provide "a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all
aspects" of its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, as
well as its development of ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), and other dispersal systems.312 Iraq was also required to
grant "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted
access" 313 to the IAEA and UNSCOM's successor, the United Nations
Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),31'
who were entitled to inspect "areas, facilities, buildings, records and
means of transport" and to interview officials.3 " The resolution also
gave UNMOVIC and IAEA the right to remove or destroy
prohibited systems, subsystems, components, records, and materials.3
It further prohibited Iraq from taking or threatening "hostile acts"
against any representative of the UN, IAEA or Member State acting
in furtherance of the inspections. 17 Finally, the resolution declared
that any false statement or omission in Iraq's declaration and Iraq's
failure to comply with the resolution and cooperate fully in its
implementation "shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's
obligations."3 '18
310. See notes 227-238 and accompanying text.
311. S.C. Res. 707, supra note 164; S.C. Res. 715, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3012th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (1991); S.C. Res. 1154, supra note 180; S.C. Res. 1284,
U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4084th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999); and most
recently S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300.
312. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, 1 3.
313. Id. 5.
314. So designated in S.C. Res. 1284, supra note 311.
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The resolution passed unanimously 3'9 and statements of the
Council's members since that time have indicated that the Council
expected Iraq to comply.2 ° That Iraq had an obligation to cooperate
is relatively uncontroversial.
2. Iraq Was in Material Breach of Its Obligations
It would be unfair to Iraq to conclude that Iraq has not
cooperated at all. Security Council resolution 1441 required Iraq to
grant access to inspectors by December 16th321 and inspections in fact
resumed on November 27,322 nearly three weeks early. Iraq was also
required to submit its declaration by December 8th323 and it did so on
December 7th.324 In terms of access to sites, UNMOVIC and IAEA
gave Iraq good marks.3 25  Apparently the large-scale problems of
denial of access to sites that inspectors encountered from 1996
through 1998326 did not recur.
UNMOVIC, however, reported some "disturbing incidents and
harassment" including demonstrations and other public "outbursts"
at UNMOVIC's offices and at inspection sites, noting that they were
"unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from
the authorities. ' '121 Iraq appeared to be trying to intimidate the
inspectors, as it had done in the past.328
Both UNMOVIC and the IAEA reported that they were unable
to conduct interviews on their own terms. By January 27, 2003,
UNMOVIC had tried to interview eleven Iraqis, all of which declined
to talk to inspectors unless the interviews took place at Iraq's
319. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644, supra note 302, at 2.
320. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644, supra note 302; U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308.
321. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, 1 5, directed inspections to begin not later that
45 days after passage of the resolution. The resolution was passed on November 8th.
322. Update report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security
Council pursuant to resolution 1441 (2002), Encl. to Letter dated 27 January 2003
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2003/95, at 3 (2003) [hereinafter IAEA Report of 27 January 2003].
323. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, 3, required Iraq to submit its declaration not
later than 30 days from the date of the resolution (8 November).
324. Statement of Mr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4692d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692 (2003).
325. Id. at 3-4; IAEA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 14.
326. See notes 171-189 and accompanying text.
327. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 4.
328. See notes 248, 252, and 254 and accompanying text.
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monitoring directorate or in the presence of an Iraqi official.32 9 IAEA
reported similar reactions with two people it tried to interview.330
UNMOVIC suggested that the individuals wanted to be able to prove
to Iraqi security officials that they had said nothing that the
authorities did not want them to say."' It appeared that the
individuals involved with Iraq's WMD programs wished to keep
relevant information from the inspectors, either on their own volition
or because Iraqi authorities had intimidated them into silence.
UNMOVIC reported that Iraq made "far-fetched allegations...
publicly that questions posed by inspectors were of an intelligence
character," even though Iraq knew that they were not.332 The U.S.
elaborated on this finding:
Iraqi Vice-President Ramadan accused the inspectors
of conducting espionage - a veiled threat that anyone
cooperating with United Nations inspectors was
committing treason.... In early December, Saddam
Hussain had all Iraqi scientists warned of the serious
consequences that they and their families would face if
they revealed any sensitive information to the
inspectors." '333
UNMOVIC reported another black mark against Iraqi
cooperation-its denial of overflights of U-2 surveillance aircraft.334
Specifically, Iraq refused to "guarantee the safety" of such flights (i.e.,
not fire on them) unless the U.S. and UK suspended their patrols of
the Southern No-Fly Zone over Iraq. However, on February 10, Iraq
declared that it would accept aerial surveillance as requested by
UNMOVIC, including the U-2s.335
Notwithstanding the three items noted above, UNMOVIC and
IAEA appeared to be satisfied overall with Iraq's cooperation on the
inspection process, and particularly access to facilities and records.
329. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 8.
330. IAEA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 11.
331. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 8.
332. Id. at 4.
333. Statement of Mr. Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, S/PV.4701, supra note
308, at 7.
334. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 4.
335. Colum Linch, Iraq to Allow Surveillance Flights, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2003,
at A12.
[26:159
Enforcing Arms Control Agreements By Military Force
In stark contrast, Iraq's cooperation in substance was quite
lacking. 36 UNMOVIC reported that Iraq's 12,000 page declaration
did not provide any new information, nor did it "respond to, clarify
and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open
disarmament issues, with which the Iraqi side should be familiar.
37
The IAEA reported its similar disappointment.338  UNMOVIC
believed that Iraq has not disclosed the full extent of its production of
VX nerve gas, that Iraq had not accounted for approximately 6500
chemical bombs and 1000 tons of chemical agents, and that Iraq had
produced more anthrax than it had declared.339 UNMOVIC reported
that Iraq had submitted a certain document in February 1999 showing
that it produced 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media (capable of
producing 5000 litres of anthrax), which the so-called "Amorim
Panel" included in its report;3 " however, in its December 7th
declaration, Iraq deliberately omitted that declaration, having
resubmitted the same document but with the table missing and the
pages renumbered.4 The IAEA also reported that the declaration
contained "no substantive differences" from its declaration to the
IAEA in 1998.14' The report went on to say, "The key outstanding
issue for IAEA is the accuracy and completeness of Iraq's declaration
that there have been no material changes in its nuclear programme
since 1998 and that its nuclear activities have been limited to the non-
proscribed use of radioisotopes., 343 What the IAEA meant was that
the IAEA did not believe Iraq's declaration to be fully truthful.
The Security Council received considerable evidence that Iraq
continued to produce or develop prohibited weapon systems in an
extraordinary presentation by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.344
336. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 3; IAEA Report of 27 January 2003,
supra note 322, at 14.
337. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 5. Mr. Blix made similar comments
on 14 February. Excerpts from Statements by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei at
the U.N., WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2003, at A27.
338. IAEA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 13.
339. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 5-6.
340. Report of the First Panel Established Pursuant to the Note by the President of
the Security Council on 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning Disarmament and
Current and Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Issues, Annex I to U.N.
Doc. S/1999/356 (1999).
341. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 6.
342. IAEA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 6.
343. Id. at 7.
344. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308.
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A phone conversation between two senior officers of Iraq's
Republican Guard indicated the possession of a "modified vehicle"
from the Al-Kindi company, which was "well-known to have been
involved in prohibited weapon systems activity." '345 At some point
Saddam Hussein's son Qusay had ordered the removal of "all
prohibited weapons," which Iraq is not supposed to have, from the
presidential palaces.346 Secretary Powell showed satellite images of
Taji, an active Iraqi chemical munitions storage facility. 7 and claimed
to have "firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on
wheels and on rails." '348 An instruction to a commander in the Second
Republican Guard Corps read "Remove the expression 'nerve agents'
whenever it comes up in the wireless instructions. "34 9 The U.S. said it
had a "source who told us that [Saddam Hussein] recently has
authorized his field commanders to use [chemical weapons]. He
would not be passing out the order if he did not have the weapons or
the intent to use them." 5' Iraq's top nuclear scientists were openly
called the "nuclear mujahideen" in the government-controlled press,
and Saddam Hussein "regularly exhorts them and praises their
progress.""35  He would not have been doing this if Iraq's nuclear
program had been abandoned. Secretary Powell showed a satellite
photo from April 2002 of a rocket engine test stand "clearly intended
for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometres, ' even though
Iraq was prohibited from producing missiles with a range greater than
150 kilometres. He also claimed to have "ample intelligence that Iraq
has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices
that can be adapted for [unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)]" and that
the U.S. had detected a UAV test flight that went 500 kilometres non-
stop, even though Iraq's December 7th declaration had claimed its
UAVs had a range of only 80 kilometres.353
This author finds the U.S.'s factual assertions to be credible, but
for the benefit of the skeptics it should be pointed out that neither
UNMOVIC nor the IAEA were willing to conclude that Iraq no
345. Id. at 3.
346. Id. at 5.
347. Id. at 6.
348. Id. at 8.
349. Id. at 11.
350. Id. at 12.
351. Id. at 13.
352. Id. at 14.
353. Id.
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longer possessed chemical and biological weapons and was no longer
developing long range missiles or nuclear weapons. UNMOVIC
inspectors found chemical warheads in a new bunker, indicating that
the warheads had been put there "at a time when Iraq should not
have had such munitions. 35 4 UNMOVIC also discovered that Iraq
had reconstituted several casting chambers, which UNSCOM
inspectors had destroyed, that "could produce motors for missiles
capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers." '355
UNMOVIC also reported that Iraq had illegally imported chemicals
used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance and control
systems."' Finally, Iraq had attempted to procure high-strength
aluminum tubes which could be used, among other things, for
manufacturing nuclear centrifuges. Whatever their true purpose was,
"it is clear.., that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited
under Security Council resolution 687."
357
There was also ample evidence that Iraq continued to conceal
weapons, documents and other evidence from inspectors.
UNMOVIC inspectors found 3000 pages of documents on laser
enrichment of uranium in the private home of an Iraqi scientist,
indicating that Iraq had deliberately dispersed documentation of its
WMD programs, including putting them into private homes, in order
to make them much harder for inspectors to find.358 The U.S. claimed
to have human intelligence that documents were placed in cars and
driven around to avoid detection, and that the hard drives of
computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced.359 Also according
to the U.S., various Iraqi security organizations received orders to
conceal all correspondence with the Organization of Military
Industrialization, which was the organization overseeing Iraq's WMD
programs, in order to avoid detection of a connection between Iraqi
WMDs and Iraqi security.36 Iraq was also deliberately concealing the
weapons themselves. For example, a certain missile brigade had
rocket launchers and biological warheads hidden in groves of trees
354. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 5.
355. Id. at 7.
356. Id.
357. Statement of Mr. Mohamed EI-Baradei, Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 10.
358. Id.
359. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 5.
360. Id. at 4.
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and were meant to be moved every 1-4 weeks to avoid detection. 36'
Secretary Powell also showed the Security Council satellite images of
Taji, mentioned earlier,3 2 having been sanitized, claiming, "We saw
this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites. 3 63 He also asserted
that Iraq had embedded parts of its chemical weapons infrastructures
within its legitimate civilian industry.3' Additionally, the biological
weapons factories mentioned before 6 5 were designed to be mobile
and therefore easy to conceal. IAEA reported that Iraq had
transferred 32 tons of HMX (a high-explosive used for nuclear
weapons and for other, legitimate purposes), which had been under
IAEA seal, for use in producing industrial explosives, but IAEA had
been unable to verify Iraq's claim because Iraq claimed all of it had
been consumed through explosions.366 Finally, the U.S. showed
evidence that Iraq had replaced weapons experts at one facility by
Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the
work that was being done there, and that Iraq had issued a false death
certificate for one scientist and sent him into hiding.
67
The assertions of the U.S., if true, are very grave indeed, and
given Iraq's pattern of misconduct and bad faith over the previous
twelve years, the evidence was highly credible. However,
UNMOVIC and IAEA were not able to verify it and it is unlikely
that they will ever be able to fully verify all of it. Because the U.S. is
not impartial, it is useful for the purpose of this analysis to give
primary weight to the evidence and findings of UNMOVIC and
IAEA. Reports from the inspectors do not present nearly as
convincing a case that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations
under Security Council Resolution 1441.
A literal reading of the text of the Resolution suggests that Iraq
would have to achieve a high threshold of non-cooperation to
materially breach it. The Resolution stated that falsities or omissions
in the 7 December declaration and failure to comply and cooperate
constituted a "further material breach" of Iraq's obligations.366
Furthermore, to be in "further material breach" Iraq had to fail to
361. Id. at 5.
362. See note 347 and accompanying text.
363. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 6.
364. Id. at 10.
365. See note 348 and accompanying text.
366. IAEA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 12.
367. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 7.
368. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, $ 4.
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comply with the provisions of this Resolution, and fail to cooperate in
the implementation of it. This leads one to ask what was required of
Iraq in this Resolution.
The exact text of Security Council Resolution 1441 specifically
required only that Iraq submit a truthful and complete declaration,
provide access to sites, documents, and people, and host the
inspectors in a manner ordinarily expected of U.N. personnel.
UNMOVIC and the IAEA agreed that Iraq's declaration was neither
completely truthful nor comprehensive. However, based on the text
of the resolution, it could be argued that a false or incomplete
declaration puts Iraq in "material breach" only if Iraq fails to comply
and cooperate as well. Regarding compliance, one could argue, Iraq
did not impede access of any sites or records; the inspectors were
allowed to go anywhere and take anything, and any documents they
requested were produced. Furthermore, UNMOVIC and IAEA did
not report any impediments to their ingress to and egress from Iraq.
Regarding the interviews, one could argue that UNMOVIC and
IAEA had insufficient evidence to conclude, and indeed did not
conclude, that the reluctance of individuals to be interviewed without
minders was directly attributable to some action on the part of Iraq.
Iraq had been careful not to directly prevent access to any of these
things. Therefore Iraq, one could argue, cooperated with the
implementation of Resolution 1441.
The foregoing argument fortunately was been asserted in the
Security Council, for it is based on the faulty premise-that the
inspections were the primary objective. As the Spanish Foreign
Minister put it, "inspections are not an end in themselves. Rather
they are the means of verifying that Iraq is carrying out effective and
complete disarmament of its arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction. 3 69 Iraq's failure to carry out its specific obligations under
Resolution 1441 may have put it in "further material breach of Iraq's
obligations,, 371 meaning the obligations under Resolution 687 and
subsequent resolutions of which Iraq, according to the Security
Council, already remained in material breach.37' Resolution 1441 was
only meant to impose on Iraq specific deadlines and obligations in
furtherance of its compliance with the underlying obligation, spelled
369. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 29.
370. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 300, T 4.
371. Id. T 1.
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372out in Resolution 687, to dismantle its WMD programs.
In terms of the underlying obligation to disarm, it is evident that
UNMOVIC, IAEA and the Security Council all agreed that Iraq had
not complied. UNMOVIC and IAEA both complained that Iraq was
cooperative in process, but not in substance. Both agencies cited the
example of South Africa, which had announced its abandonment of
its nuclear program and had been very proactive in taking measures
to instill confidence in inspectors that it was in fact doing SO. 3 71 In
stark contrast, Iraq had not gained UNMOVIC's or IAEA's
confidence or trust, nor had those agencies found Iraq's cooperation
to be proactive. 374 Reported the Director General of the IAEA, "we
have emphasized the need to shift from passive support - that is,
responding as needed to inspectors' requests - to proactive support -
that is, voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing documentation,
people and other evidence that will assist in filling in the remaining
gaps in our information." '375 UNMOVIC opined in January that "Iraq
appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today -
of the disarmament that was demanded of it. 37 6 IAEA was unable to
give "credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons
programme. 3 77 Iraq had not gained IAEA's confidence even after
twelve years, nor had it gained the confidence of members of the
Security Council, who while not finding Iraq in material breach of its
obligations at that moment, did agree that Iraq needed to be more
proactive and do more to gain the Council's confidence."7
3. Iraq's Breach Constitutes an Injury
What injury did Iraq's continued intransigence inflict on other
States that entitled them, and the United States in particular, to
forcibly change its government? Much of the answer lies in the two
preceding sections on Osiraq and Operation Desert Fox. To
summarize, Iraq had a duty, both treaty-based and under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, to cease its development of nuclear, biological
372. See notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
373. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 2, 11.
374. Id. at 3; IA EA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 14.
375. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, supra note 324, at 11.
376. Id. at 2.
377. IAEA Report of 27 January 2003, supra note 322, at 13.
378. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 18 (China); id. at 21 (Russia); id. at
22 (Cameroon); id. at 27 (Pakistan); id. at 30 (Chile); id. at 31 (Angola); id. at 35
(Guinea); id. at 36 (Germany).
[26:159
Enforcing Arms Control Agreements By Military Force
and chemical weapons, to destroy existing stocks of such weapons,
and to dismantle its programs for developing such weapons. Iraq
embarked instead on a large-scale effort to develop and stockpile
these weapons, as well as delivery systems, in flagrant violation of its
obligations. To suggest otherwise, that Iraq no longer possessed
WMDs in the face of large amounts of unaccounted for munitions
and chemical precursors, is an exercise in self-delusion. Iraq is an
original party of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the ink of
which was barely dry when Iraq launched its program to develop a
nuclear bomb.379 When UNSCOM weapons inspections began after
the Gulf War, Iraq's biological, chemical and missile programs went
underground. Iraq systematically concealed equipment and
documents and made it impossible for UNSCOM to complete its
work. The threat from Iraq was genuine and serious.
The Iraqi leadership had no respect whatsoever for the rules of
peaceful coexistence with other States, and had the means,
opportunity and motive to attack other States. Iraq was a highly
aggressive State, having used chemical weapons in warfare, invaded
and raped Kuwait, and used Scud missiles as weapons of terror
against Israeli civilians. Its stance toward Israel had not changed, nor
apparently had its stance on Kuwait. There was no reason to believe
that, given the chance to do so with impunity, Iraq would not "finish
the job" by re-annexing Kuwait. Additionally, because of the very
prominent role the U.S. took in defeating Iraq militarily during the
Gulf War, it was the most likely target of Iraqi revenge, as manifested
by its attempt to assassinate President Bush (the elder), who was in
office during the Gulf War."' Iraq also posed a threat to Saudi
Arabia, whose territory also would be valuable to Iraq. Saudi Arabia
was also a key member of the coalition during the Gulf War and Iraq
had also launched Scud missiles attacks against that country.8 The
injury justifying Operation Desert Fox to enforce the disarmament
provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 was the certainty that a
379. Iraq deposited its instrument of ratification of the NPT on October 29, 1969
and the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970. E-mail from State Department,
supra note 91. In 1971 its nuclear weapons program was underway. HAMZA, supra
note 74, at 333.
380. For an extensive discussion of the incident and the legality of the U.S. 1993
air strikes on Iraq in response, see Robert F. Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination
Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate International Law in Forcefully
Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569 (1995).
381. LAWRENCE FREEDMAN & EFRAiM KARSH, THE GULF CONFLICT 1990-1991,
DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 307 (1993).
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revanchist Iraq running amok would eventually commit a devastating
attack against another State.
Iraq also represented a terrorist threat, being known to have
supported terrorism in the past.3 2 The Ba'ath government and the
A-Qa'ida terrorist network both shared a deep hatred for Israel and
the United States,383 and despite their religious differences would be
natural allies in a covert war against the West and the United States
in particular. Indeed, the U.S. has presented evidence that Iraqi
intelligence provided training and support to Al-Qa'ida, particularly
to the affiliated Zarqawi network which operated in Kurdish-held
territory in northern Iraq.3" Such an alliance, where weapons of mass
destruction are involved, would eventually have resulted in an attack
of a severity rivaling that of September 11th, 2001. Saddam Hussein
with weapons of mass destruction was simply a catastrophe waiting to
happen.
4. Was Regime Change the Appropriate Remedy?
Based on UNMOVIC's assessment that Iraq had not renounced
the use of weapons of mass destruction and continued to stockpile
them, it was reasonable to conclude that Iraq was in material breach
of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 and
subsequent resolutions. Several members of the Security Council
shared this view."' The appropriate remedy was not the continuation
382. Iraq has supported Palestinian terrorist groups such as the Abu Nidal
Organization, the Arab Liberation Front and the Palestinian Liberation Front, as
well as terrorist groups in Turkey and Iran. CORDESMAN, supra note 264, at 185. An
UNSCOM inspection team found a school for anti-terrorism that was actually a
training camp for terrorism. RITrER, supra note 161, at 120-121. Richard Butler
recounts a plot by Iraqi agents to attack various embassies in Bangkok. BUTLER,
supra note 159, at 35-36.
383. For a first-hand account of AI-Qa'ida's politics, see OSAMA BIN LADEN ET AL,
JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS: WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT STATEMENT (Feb.
23, 1998) (on file with author). The original statement was published in AI-Ouds Al-
Arabi on Feb. 23, 1998. An English translation is posted on the Washington Post
website at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=
&contentId=A4993-2001Sep21 (last visited Oct. 27, 2001). The word "Crusader" is a
euphemism for the U.S.
384. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 14-16.
385. Id. at 17 (U.S.); id. at 19 (Great Britain); id. at 26 (Bulgaria). At the same
meeting, Spain did not use the words "material breach," but its statement shows that
to be Spain's opinion: "Saddam Hussain has not renounced his plan to use such
weapons." Id. at 29.
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of inspections as several Security Council members suggested,386 for it
had become painfully apparent that not even the threat of force
would be sufficient to convince Iraq to disarm; indeed, the threat of
force only would have driven the program further underground.
Under the same analysis presented in the section of this article on
Operation Desert Fox, the appropriate remedy to the threat posed by
the rogue regime was the use of force to destroy Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction program. The question that remains, therefore, is
whether the appropriate remedy included removing that rogue
regime from power.
If this question were being posed ten years ago, it would
probably be answered in the negative. In the present, however, the
opposite conclusion is called for. Iraq's conduct during the last twelve
years-its stubborn endurance of U.N. sanctions when it had only to
disarm to get them lifted; its constant, brazen denials; its willingness
to continue its programs after numerous threats of force and several
actual uses of force-demonstrated that as long as the Ba'ath party
remained in power, Iraq would continue to manufacture chemical and
biological weapons and continue its program develop nuclear
weapons.
An additional justification existed for the removal of the Ba'aths
from power: humanitarian intervention. Iraq had one of, if not the,
worst human rights records in the Middle East. Butler, Ritter and
Hamza have all recounted harrowing instances of frequent and
widespread violations of fundamental human rights-arbitrary
detentions and seizures, extrajudicial killings, and torture, including
innocent family members being raped or otherwise tortured in front
of the authorities' intended subjects. 87 The Ba'ath government also
massacred thousands of Kurds (militant separatists and civilians
alike), including attacking the town of Halabja with the same
chemical weapons it used against Iran.3" The Ba'aths had no
accountability whatsoever to law or the Iraqi people and had absolute
386. Id. at 21 (Russia); id. at 22 (Cameroon); id. at 24 (France); id. at 25 (Mexico);
id. at 27 (Pakistan); id. at 30 (Chile). Only Syria, also controlled by the Ba'ath party,
and who quite inappropriately tries to tie the Iraq question to Israeli occupations,
contests the finding that Iraq constitutes a threat to its neighbors. Id. at 33-34.
387. RITER, supra note 161; BUTLER, supra note 159; HAMZA, supra note 74. See
also SAMIR AL-KHALIL, REPUBLIC OF FEAR (1989). U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell also mentioned Iraq's human rights in passing during his presentation to the
Security Council on February 5, 2003. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701, supra note 308, at 17.
388. See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
2003]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
power, and was absolutely corrupt. Saddam Hussein was to Iraq what
Idi Amin was to Uganda. On its human rights record alone, Iraq was
an excellent candidate for a humanitarian intervention in order to
free the Iraqi people from the constant fear of a relatively small group
who could do, and in fact did, anything to them with total impunity.
The totality of the two doctrines of anticipatory self-defense and
humanitarian intervention weighed heavily in favor of a forcible
regime change. Given the technological advantage of U.S. forces
over Iraqi forces, it was expected that the collateral loss of innocent
life not of Iraq's own doing would be negligible compared to the
deaths already attributable to the Ba'ath regime and to the number of
lives that would be lost in a chemical or biological attack. With the
invasion now in hindsight, such proved to be the case. Considering
what was at stake, it was reasonable and appropriate, if not desirable,
for the United States to act alone. As Anthony D'Amato was
frequently quoted during the Gulf War, "multilateral action is better




Had the Ba'ath party remained in power in Iraq, it would have
continued to benefit from its unlawful acts. Iraq obtained the benefit
of access under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear
technology when all the time it was using that benefit to totally
violate the object and purpose of that Treaty. For twelve years Iraq
benefited from the cease-fire of Security Council Resolution 687, by
not having to fight a large-scale war with an international coalition,
while it remained in material breach of a key provision of the cease-
fire agreement by continuing its weapons of mass destruction
programs unimpeded. Ruth Wedgwood summed it up perfectly when
she wrote, "Iraq could hardly cloak itself in the cease-fire's benefits
while flagrantly violating one of its principal conditions."3" The
occupation of the Ba'ath party in a position of power in Iraq was a
threat to the peace and security of many if not all other States,
including particularly the United States. A regime change in Iraq was
an appropriate remedy for those States which had been injured by
Iraq's extreme delinquency. Having been so long in the making, this
389. D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike, supra note 78, at 263.
390. Wedgwood, supra note 200, at 726.
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remedy took a 900-pound gorilla to accomplish, for an 800-pounder
was no longer adequate. The lesson learned is that the longer such an
intolerable situation continues, the larger the gorilla must grow in
order to deal with it effectively. 9
391 This article was originally prepared and accepted for publication prior to the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Operating jointly, the U.S. and UK took
less than a month to defeat Iraq's armed forces and drive the Ba'ath party out of
power, doing so without any express authorization from the Security Council.
Coalition troops continue to occupy Iraq as of this writing (May 2003) while a
provisional government is forming. No weapons of mass destruction have yet
been found in Iraq, but the weapons and materials discussed above have still not
been accounted for and the search has not yet begun in earnest.
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